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l. Introduction 
Since 1990, three different U.S. Presidents have accused Iraqi leader 
Saddam Hussein of comJllitting grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions and acts of genocide. 1 Although the Geneva Conventions and the 
Genocide Convention require state parties to bring offenders to justice, on the 
eve of the 2003 invasion of Iraq, President George W. B.ush offered to call off 
the attack if Saddam Hussein and his top lieutenants would agree to relinquish 
power and go into e]dle.2 This vv~s no publicity stunt, as some have 
characterized it Working through President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt, the 
United States actively pursued the matter with several Mideast countries, 
ultimately persuading Bahrain to agree to provide sanctmrry to Hussein if hi"c 
accepted the deaL3 '\Nhen Hussein rejected the proposal, Bush promised that 
illie Iraqi leader vvoukl be forced from power and prosecuted as a war criw.ina!.4 
Admittedly, thousands of lives could have been spared if Hussein had 
accepted the deaL But at the risk of being accused of blindly ern bracing Kant's 
prescription that "justice must be done even should the heavens fall,"5 this 
I. See Michael P. Scharf, Don't Just Fight Him, Indict Him, L.ft_. TIMES, Oct. 6, 2002, at 
J\111 (recounting Hussein regime's atrocities); Michael JP. Scharf, Can This Man Get a Fair 
Trial? \.VASH. PosT, Dec. 19, 2004, at Bl ("[T]here is a mountain of evidence of atrocities 
t:0rPJ11itted by Hu~sein!~ reg~rne. 11 ). On July 1, 2004~ Saddan1I"1ussein was arraigned before the 
Iraqi Special Tribunal, and informed that he was charged 'Nith (I) rhe systematic kiiling of 
religious figures in 1974, which constituted a crime against humanity; (2) killing off the Kurdish 
Barzani clan in 1983. which constituted genocide; (3) torturing and ki!!ing members of political 
parties over the last thirty years, which constituted a crime against humanity; (4) using chemical 
weapons against the K.urds in Halabja in 1988, which constituted a crime against humanity:, 
(5) the "fo~nfar' ethnic c1ec~n.!::-~r:g campaign agtiinst ~-:.urds ~!I l937-iS8, vv>hicit constittneQ_ 
genocide; (6) war crimes during the 1990 invasion of Kuwait, vvhich cons1itutf.d grave. bTe::wh.P.s 
of the Geneva Convei1tions; and (7) the drying up of river:)~ killing hundreds of thouscnds 0E 
Uicusb .A.rabs in response to their 1991 uprising, which constituted genocide. Charges Facing 
5addam Hussein, BBC ]',JEWS, July 1, 2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/332D293. 
stm (last visited Jan. 26, 2006). -
2. See Julian Borger, Diplomacy Dies, Now jt' s War: Bush Gives Sad dam and h.' is So;!s 
:.;1.8 _Hours ro L£ave lraq or :.c;'ace !vlassiv£ J11ilittli)' Onslattghi. GUARDJAN (LONDON\ lVlar. 18; 
~~oo:;~ at 1 (describing President Bush\~ exile offer). 
3. .Em.ily Wa;~, Arab Leaders FaiT in Last Minute Efforts: Mubcrak Blames Iraq, 
·Cal!tions Coalition: Bahrain Signals that it H'ould Give lfussein Sanctt!OlJI~ V;f ASH. PosT, h1:ar. 
2C, 2D03, at A21. 
4. Richard 'N. Stevenson, Threats m1d Responses: The .President; Bush Gives Hussein 
48 Hours, and Vows to Act, l'l.Y. Tlli1ES, lV!ar. 18, 2003, at 1. 
5. IMMANUEL KANT,. TB£ METAPHYSICS OF f'10RALS ltl.). (l1.ilm:: Gregor t:-an8., Camt.ridge 
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Article argues that it was inappropriate for the Bush Adnlinistraiion even to 
make the offer, and that if implemented the exile-for-peace deal would have 
seriously underrrilned the Geneva Conventions and the Genocide Convention, 
which require prosecution of alleged offenders without exception. 
A few months after the invasion of Iraq, U.S. officials helped broker a deal 
whereby Liberian President Charles Taylor, who had been indicted for crimes 
against humanity by the Special Court for Sierra Leone, agreed to give up 
power and was allowed to flee to 1\Tigeria, where he received asylum. 6 At t.he 
time, forces opposed to Taylor, which had taken over most of the country, were 
on the verge of attacking the capitaJ city Monrovia, and tens of th.o11sands of 
civilian casualties were forecast. The exile dea~ averij:ed the crisis and set the 
stage for insertion of a U.N. peacekeeping mission that stabilized the country 
and set ii on a path to peace and democracy.7 liil contrast to the Hussein case, 
the Taylor arrangement did not in any way violate international law. This 
fo.Iticle exp!ains '.Vhy imemctional !.aw should treat 1the il:wo sih]a1tions 
differently, prohibiting exile and asylum for Saddam Hussein while permitting 
such a justice-for-peace exchange in the case of Charles Taylor. 
This is the first scholarly article in recent years to focus on the significant 
issue of exile. Scholarship on the analogous issue of amnesty has been written 
largely from the point of view of aggressive advocates of international justice, 
~Nhcsc ~.nriting its based on the assumption ttait the vvidesr:iread state practice 
favming am_Desties constitl~tes a v]olation of, ]·ather than il reflection of. 
intemational1avv' in this area. 8 Before analyzing the relevant legal principles, 
1991) (1785). 
6. Ryan JLizza, Charles at Large, NEW REPUBLIC Apr. 25, 2005, at 10. 
7. ld. 
3. See IVl. CHER!F BASSnOUNl, CRIMES AGA!i,IST HUIVIANJTY IN KNTERNATIONALLAW, 492, 
500-01 {1.992) (arguing th.~t there is an inten1atic;u~l dut:,• t·J pr0s~.c~:.rt,~ o~- c;~ti'f•.dilc those \;v-bo 
<"::onnnit crirn.es against humanity); Leiia l'·ladya SadEt, UniPersal }urisdictioi1: iJatiana/ 
Arnnesties= and Truth Conunissions: Reconciling the hTecorzciiable, in UNIVERSAL 
JURISDICTION: HAT!ONAL COURTS Al'lD Tl-l.E PROSECUTION OF SERIOUS CRIMES UNDER 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 194-201 (Stephen Macedo ed., 2003) (arguing that aw..nesties create a 
''c;.~lture of impurrity 11 incompatible V.'ith intem~ticnn1 jt:tsticc); I-lL Chei·if :Sassiounil 
lnt<!matioilal Crimes: Jus Cogens and Obligatio Erga Omnes, 59lLAW &CONTElvJP. PROBS. 63, 
63 (1996) (arguing that stales have an obligation w prosecute jus cogens crimes); Carl:l 
Edelenbos, Human Rights Violations: A Duty to Prosecute?, 7 LE!DEi'-1 J.lNT'LL. 5, l"!- (!994) 
(noting U.N.'s affirmation of duty to prosecute ··.var crimes); Diane F. Orent!icbl'!r, Settling 
Account: The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights Violaiions of a Prior Regime, 100 YALE LJ. 
2.537, 2585,2593 (l99l) (eJlplaining that analysts interpret law generated by the Nuremberg 
trials, and U.N. actions ratifying that law, to "require punishment of crimes against humanity"); 
Naomi Robt-Arriaza, Stare Responsibility to Investigate and Prosecute Grave Human Riehts 
Violations in lntemational Law, 78 CALL REV. 451, 461 (1990) (urging the necessii:y of an 
international duty to investigate grave human violations). 
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fhe Artide begins with an exar-nination of the practical cons1derations that 
counsel for and against the practice of "trading justice for peace." Next, using 
the Saddam Hussein and Charles Taylor cases as a focal point, the Article 
analyzes the relevant intemational instruments which require prosecution under 
lin1ited circumstances. This is followed by a critique of the popular view that 
customary international law and the principle of jus co gens broadly prohibit 
actions that prevent prosecution of crimes under international law. The Article 
establishes that there does not yet exist a customary international law mle 
requiring prosecution of war crimes in internal anned conflict or crimes agai11st 
humanity, but that there is a duty to prosecute in the case of grave breaches of 
the Geneva Conventions, lhe crime of genocide, and torture. ·where the duty to 
prosecu~e does apply, it is important that states and international organizations 
honor it, fest they signal disrespect for the important treaties from which the 
duty arises, potentially putting their own citizens at risk and generaHy 
lJll1Kienmning the mle of law. 
fl. Practical Considerations 
A. Interests Favoring Exile, Asylum, and Amnesty 
r,JoQvvithstanding the populai! catch pr«ase: of ihe J!.990s-"no peace 
without justice"-achieving peace and obtaining justice are sometimes 
incompatible goals-at least in the short term. In order to end an international 
or intem£:] conflict, negotiatiotr:~s oflten mus~ be held! with the verj leaders who 
are respom;ible for war crimes and crimes against humanity. When this is the 
case, insisting on criminal prosewtions can pro]ong the conflict, resulting in 
more deaths, destruction, and human suffering. 9 
Reflecli:ing i:his reality, during the past thirty years, AlillgoTia, A.rgentlina, 
18nilzit Cambodia, Chilie, El SaJvador, Guatemala, Hmtli, Hondll!ras, Jlvory 
Coast, NicaragiLia, lP'em, Sien-a Leone, South Africa, Togo, and Uli'uguay have 
e;:iH;;h, .as part of a peace am:ulligement, granted arrrnesity to members of the former 
• I~ . d . . l • . I . •J • . b d 10 regnme ttu<:~J com .. illliHe. mtematwnaR cnmes w1tnm wen- respect!'/e or .ers. 
S'. As an anonymous government official stated in an oft-quoted articie: "The quest for 
justice for yesterday's victims of atrocities should not be pursued in such a manner that it makes 
today' s living the dead of tomorrow." Anonymous, Human Rights in Peace Negotiations, 18 
X""'lUM. RTS. Q. 249, 258 (1996). 
10. See Steven Ratner, New Democracies, Old Atrocities: An lnquil~l' in International 
Law, 87 GEO. l..J. 707, 722-23 ( 1999) (mentioning the governments in transitional democracies 
that have passed amnesty laws); Roht-A.rriaza, supra note 8, at 461 (noting grants of amnesty in 
Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, Gm1tema!a, and El S<>lvac!or); Michael P. Schmf, The Letter oft he 
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With respect to five of these countries-Cambodia, EI Salvador, Haiti, Sierra 
Leone, and South Africa-"the United Nations itself pushed for, helped 
negotiate, or endorsed the granting of amnesty as a means of restoring peace 
d ' . ,]] an aemocratlc government. 
In addition to ainnesty (which immunizes the perpetrator from domestic 
prosecution), exile and asylum in a foreign country (which puts the perpetrator 
out of the jurisdictional reach of domestic prosecution)12 is often used to induce 
regime change, with the blessing and involvement of significant states and the 
United Nations. Peace negotiators caU this the "Napoleonic Option," in 
reference to the treatment of French emperor Napoleon Bonaparte who, after 
his defeat at V\1 ater1oo in 1815, was exiled to St Helena rather than face trial or 
execution. 13 I<v1ore recently, a number of dictators have been granted sanctuar-y 
abroad in retum for relinquishing power. Thus, fm example, Ferdinand Marcos 
fled the Philippines for Hawaii; Baby Doc Duvalier fled Haiti for France; 
lVIengisthu Haile Miriam fled Ethiopia for Zirnbabwe; Kd.i A.min fled Uganda 
for Saudi Arabia; General RaouL Ce:dras fled Haiti for Panama; and Cbcrles 
Taylor fled Liberia for exile in Nigeria-a deal negotiated by the United States 
and U.N. envoy Jacques KJein. 14 
As Pay am Akhann, then Legal! Adviser to the Office of ~he Prosecutor of 
the International Criminal Tribunal for the Fonner Yugoslavia, absented a 
decc:de ago: "[K]t is not l.ml.llst.m!. in !the political stage to see ~he rnet:amorphosis 
of yesterday's war monger into today' s peace broker. "15 This is because, unless 
the international community is willing to use force to topple a rogue regime, 
cooperation of the leaders is needed to bring about peaceful regime change and. 
put an end to violations of international humanitarian law. Yet, it is not 
realistic to expect them to agree to a peace settlement if, directly foHowing ~he 
Law: The Scope c~(the lntemational Legal Obligation io P'rosecme Human Rights O·imc:s, 59 
LAW & CONTEMP. !PROBS . .q.], 4-! 0 996) (discussing these cot.mtries' am.11.esty programs). 
ll. Scharf, supra note 10, at '-H. 
12. In cases of exile, the state wbere the offense occurred (the territorial state) cannot 
commence proceedings as it does not have physical custody over the accused, and the sanctuary 
state is generally prevented from prosecuting or extraditing by the doctrine of head of state 
lrillTtunity. See, e.g., Regir1a ~v. Bvv-.; ~t. 1\lletrG. ~tipendiw-:-y r.1agi~trate, ::;; partz P'inochet Ugart~ 
(No.3), [2000] 1 A.C. 147, 242 (H.L. 1999) (U.K.) (noting that the doctrine "protects all acts 
which the head of state has pedormed in the exercise of the functions of government"). 
13. MICHAEL F. SCHARF, BALKP.J~ JUSTICE: THE STORY BEHJNDTHEF'IRSTlNTERNAT!ONAL 
WAR CRIMES TRIAL SINCE i'-lURE!viBERG 5 (1997). 
lL!-. See Davs Gilson, The Exile Files, 2.003 (Ang. 2], 2003), http://wwv<.globa! 
policy.org/intljustice/generai/2003/0826exile.htm (discussing the exile arrangements of more 
than a dozen individuals). 
15. Payam Akhavan, The Yugosiav Tribunai at a Cross;·oads: The Dayton Peace 
Agreement and Beyond, ! g HuM. RTs. Q. 259, 271 (1996). 
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agreement, they wou]d find themselves m their close associates facing potential 
life imprisonment 
This conclusion findE support in the observations of the 2004 JR.eport of 
the Kntemational Truth and Reconciliation Comt-nission for Sierra Leone: 
The Commission i.s unable to condemn the resort to amnesty oy those 
who negotiated the Lome Peace Agreement [which provides amnesty to 
persons who committed crimes against humanity in Sierra Leone]. The 
explanations given by the Goverwuent negotiators, including in their 
testimonies before the Truth and Reconciliation Comrn.ission, are 
compelling in this respect. In all good faith, they believed Lhat the RUF 
[insurgents] would not agree to end hostilities if the Agreement 'Nere not 
acconnpanied by a fom] of pBxdon or arrtnesty. 
Th~: CvrH<iussion is unable l:o declare that it considers arn..nesty too high 
a price to pay for the delivery of peace to .Sierra Leone, under the 
circumstances thai prevailed in July 1999. Kt is true that the Lome 
Agreement did not immediately return the country to peacetime. Yet it 
rro'.rided the framevmrk for a pro!:ess that pacified \he combatants and, fi'ie 
years later, has returned Sierra Leoneans to a context in which they need 
not fear daily violence and atrocity. 16 
In bmkering the Charles Taylor exile deal, the United States and United 
l'Ta!:ions were particularly encouraged by the success of similar amnesty/exile 
for peace: 211-:rangemeu.ts rdatnng to Hailti and South Africa in the 1990s. From 
1990-:1.994, Haiti was mled by a military regime headed by General Raoi 
Cedras and Brigadier Genera] JP'hi!ippe Biamby, which execljted over 3000 
civiha!1 poHtical oppollients and tortured scores of others.l7 The United Nations 
mediated negotiations at Govemors Isl<md in Ne~<v ~i{ ork Harbor, ]n wh~ch the 
nrnil]1tary li~a.der::. Btgreed ~o relll1lllC]11JJl]~t1 pn,:ver snd pernillt \~EJ1e retu~-r;. ::;f ·~h~: 
democratkaHy eiec[erdilP'resk!lent (Jean-Bertnmcl Aristide) in xetJ.m'l! for <! fnH 
ECIG1esty fOr ~he r~i~ten1bf;rs of the regllm.e and a Hfti~·Bg of the econorrric scnH~llions 
i:mpose<Cl by the U.T..J. Security Counci1. 18 Under pressure frorn d1e Un]ted 
l 6. 3H V./!Ti'!ESS TO TRUTH: k?.EPORT OF THE SIERRA LEONE TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION 
COlvlMlSSION 365 (2004), quoted in 1)\lilliam A. Schabas, Amnesty, rhe Sierra Leone Trl!th and 
Reconciliation Commission and the Special Couri'for Sierm Leone, !1 U.C. DAVIS J. ill'iT'LL. & 
PoL'Y 14-5, 163-64 (2004-). Schabas, the Director of the Irish Centre for Human Rights, was a 
member of the !nternat.ionai Truth Cornmission for Sierra JLeone. 
17. See Michael P. Scharf, Swapping Amnesty for Peace: lVas There n Duty zo Prosecute 
lntemational Criilles in Haiti?, 3! TEX. liNT'L L.J. l, 4-5 (1996) (describing human rights 
violations documented by the U.S. Department of State and various human rights groups). 
H> 
'o. See The Secretary-General, The Situation of Democracy and Hwnan Rights in Haiti, 
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Nations mediators, Aristide agreed to the arr .... "lesty clause of the Governors 
Island Agreement. 19 The Security Council immediately "declared [its] 
1eadiness to give the fullest possible support to the Agreement signed on 
Governors Island,."20 which it later said constitutes "the only valid framework 
.r - ] • r h . . • 7V •• n2J nrh >1-. ·r 1 ..:1 • • • 1' wr th~ ;:·eso~utwn or Le cns1s m nmt!. v•. -"en tue :rr>J,!t~ry _eauers rmt!a 1y 
failed to comply with the Governors Island Agreement, on July 31, 1994, the 
Security Council took L~e extreme step of authorizing an invasion of Haiti by a 
multinational force. 22 On the eve of the invasion on September 18, 1994, a deal 
-was struck, whereby General Cedras agreed to retire his command and accept 
exi1e in response to a genentl amnesty voted into lavv by the Haitian parliarnent 
" c~ - -- · - J: · -1 ~J anc; an one:i' by lt-'anama to prov1d.t ~mn asy1um.-
The amnesty deal had its desired effect The democratically elected 
Aristic!e was permitted to return to Haiti and reinstate a civilian government; 
the nnlitary leaders left the country for sanctuary in Panama, much of the 
military sunendered. their arms, and most of the human rights abuses promptly 
el~ded-aH 'Nith practically no bloodshed or res:istance?4 Although the 
~:jtuation in Haiti has once: again deteriorated, with a ·wave of violei1t protests 
and strikes erupting in 2004, the more recent problems were due largely to 
President Aristide's mismanagement and comJptio:n, not the fact tlut the 
·-1· 1 l r~ · h 1· rys D1Ui.?,ry _eac:ers escapeu pums_ ment ten years eaL!er.-
U.H. Doc. S/26063, AJ47/975 (July 12, 1993) (reproducing the text of the Governors Island 
i•~greement). The Governors Island Agreement was supplemented oy a document known as the 
i'k•v York Paci. which was signed by the two sides on July 16, 1993. Paragraph 4 of the New 
York Pact provides that "[t]he political forces and parliamentary blocs undertake to ensure that 
;:he: -fallowing laws are passed. on the bases of an emergency procedure: ... (ii) Act concerning 
i:hf a_i_·rm~sty. ~~ The Secretary-()eneraL The Siruation of.Denioci·acy and }{unuin. Rights in linili 
~Em·::o.1[4, :;_ul. Doc. S/26297, ?J47/IOOO (Aug. 13, 1993). 
I 9. See lrwin F. Stolzky, Haiti: Searching for Altemmives, in IMPUI'I!TY AND HUMM! 
T~JGHT~: iN li·~TERHATfC:NAL ~n Vv' AND PRACTICE i gg (I"JaoiTti f.~oht-iirfiaza eci.~ 1 S"'S15) (describing 
f::.J:i2'.fide's 'Jpposi~1on lo gn:lnting arrn1esty to '',::orY!lY!.OI! cl·irninHls" H.nd his uhi1T1aie t:::~tpitu]Htion 
i;·~ tfv: facs of tre:rnendous pressure). Professor Stutzky of the Un1vcrsity of f/Iiami Schno~ of 
La•P served as Aristide's legal adviser while A.ristide was in exile in the United Stales. 
~!.G. Letter f;:om the PreDident of the Security ·Council to the S.ecretary-(JenerD.l~ ~J.I'l 
:~(:\)R, ci8th Sess. at 120, U.N. Doc. S/lil'JF/49 (July 15, 1993). 
'}I Staternent of the President of the Sec:ur!ty r2ouncH, ~JJ·!. 2.rCOR, ~~!.8ih Se~s., 3293th 
mtg. at 126, U.N. Doc. S/INF/49 (Oct. 25, 1993). 
22 S.C. R~s. 940, 1[4, U.N. Doc. S/i'ES/940 (July 3], !99,!). 
')·:~ h7aitian Lawrnaker:; Pass Partial .Anznesty to .Pressure C'ec!ras, ('cnvnvL P;,.PPEAL 
~)JI::-rnphi~~)~ ·Dct. 3: 1994, at .!~~1. 
~4. See h1aggie O'I(ane, After the YGHks J-lal'e Gone, GUARDIAN (LCtndon), Feb. J g,] 995~ 
c;l /"i· (deSC!ibing Aristide's generally peaceful return to power). 
~5. International Crisis ~Group, A j'leH' C:hance for .r-Jaiti?, !nteruational~Crisis '\_:tt.)t!p 
}c.epvrl He.. 10, 7-11 (l'·lov. 1 fl, 2004). 
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South P:..f~ic:c. stands as another SEC(;t::ss sto~y, in.dico.ting the potential \'a.lue 
of trading jus~jce for peace. l 1rom 1960 to 1994; thousands of b1ack South 
Africans ·were persecuted and mistreated under that country's apartheid system. 
~With the prospect of a bloody civil war looming over negotiations, "[t]he 
C)Utgaing l~aderE n.1ade some form of a_rfu!esty for those responsible for the 
' d' ' ~ 1. fu' £: .r: -- ' · · n°6 reg1me a con :stron A or il:n1e peace~ .T;! trans1er to a .PJHj' aemocr2.tic soc1et)'- -
The !eaders of the majmity black population decided that the commitment to 
afford anmesty was a fair price for a relatively peaceful transition to fdl 
democracy. 27 Xn accordance vvith the negotiated settlement between the major 
parties, on July 19, 1995, the South African Parliament created a nfruth and 
Reconciliation Con11.--nission, consisting of a Cor£mtittee on Human Rights 
'\1iola.tions .. a. l[;or.Thl.rn~iuee on Jli::.rn_nesty~ and a Conwlittee on P._eparation ~nd 
Rehabi!itation. 28 Under this process, arrmesty would be available on!y to 
individuals vvho personally applied for it and who disdosed fully the facts of 
their apartheid crimes. After conducting 140 public hearings and considering 
20,000 written and. oral submissions, the South African Truth Commission 
. ". - " r ,.,- ~ ~ . ~ -. - b - n 1 o:ro OQ T 11 puD·Hsl1e:ct a .!. / .Y:}-page report or rts JIIndirngs oB (i~Jcto~·e.r ~LY, ~ _.., :.;o_--~ _·: . .r.o~·~ 
observers believe the amnesty in South Af1ica headed off incieasing tensions 
and a potential civil vvar. 
it is a common rr'lisconception that ~rading amnesty or exile for peace is 
,stJEivaient to the ~bsence of 21.ccmmtabilitv ;:nnd rerh·P:ss30 As in the Haitian and 
.! ~---,) ----· --- -·-- -
~~olL!!th AJI-ican situ3:tion1ls described above 9 anr1nestties can be tied t~J 
accountability mechanisms ithat are less invasive i:han domestic or international 
prosecution. Ever more frequently in the aftermath of an &HJJ.I1esty- or exile-for-
peace d.eai, d'ie corncemed1 govennneRlS have made mone!BJ}' reparat]ons to the 
'lictim~ arnd their f;:umlies, established! truth r:o1nwjssioEl!s to document the 
8Jbuses (8XJ.d sonltet]nl!es idlerrdfy perpetrators by nanne)~ Lu1d have 
eRnploym~.::nt bans and purges (refeHed to as ") 1tb2Jt l~eep ~uch 
. . P • c • ~ • ]' 31 "1\Tf" '] "j· • • T perpecn:nors ..n.ron1 posEUOlllis or pu.b,_]c t1ru.nst \/\ HRje rhot t~1e ~~arne as c:rr.tTB.Inc~:. 
r;,::; I·.tlAI?.TP~J\ L1INO\N; ]2ETVVi:EH 11EI,lGEflj··JCE A.f\!D JFORG~VEJ•-!E.~S 52 (1998). 
17. !d. at 55. 
28. l"'lationc.l Unity and Reconci]1D.tion A.ct 34- of J.99.:J §§ 2~ 12 .. 16 /J!.. 23. 
29. The te;ct of the South P1.frican Truth Cor.o.Er!:issior!' s ]Report is a:vailable on the Ini.ernet 
r:l ··N\~'''~'.info.gov .za/o(herdocs/2003/trc. 
30. Sec ·,:.ViHiam Vti. Burke-'\ltfhite, Hefh:uning ];npunity: Applying Liberallnfenuiiional 
Lnn-' Tht:oi~,, ;o an Anof_vsis of A.rnnesty Legislation~ 42 ~'-.!1ARV. Xr-.JT'L LJ. 467. 482 (2001) 
(clnssifying arnnesties into fonr categories~ from lea.st tc n1ost legitimate: (l) ''Blanker 
P._n1lv:stiesll; (2) 11 L8caHy Legiti1n.ized~ Parti8] Kminunitles:~; (3) "Enternat]ona!ly Legitin1i2.ed: 
Panial !mn1unities~~~ and (L!.) l!Constitutional Kn1muniti 1). 
31. i'JAOlVll ROHT-ARR!AZA, Kh1PUNlTY AND HUivlAI'i RiGHTS IN liNTERNAT!ONAL lLAW Ai'ID 
!PRACTICE 282-91(1995). 
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prosecution, these mechanisms do encompass much of -what justice is intended 
to accomplish: prevention, deterrence, punishment, and rehabilitation. lindeed, 
some experts believe that these mechanisms do not just constitute "a second 
best approach" when prosecution is impracticable, but that in many situations 
they may be better suited to achieving the aims of justice. 32 
B. Factors Favoring Prosecution 
Although providing amnesty and exile to perpetrators may be a_n effective 
\vay to induce regime change without having to resort to force, th.ere are severa] 
important cm:mtervailing considerations favoring prosecui':ion that suggest 
amnesty/exile should be a bargaining tool of last resort reserved only for 
extreme situations. In particular, prosecuting leaders responsible for violations 
of international humanitarian law is necessary to discourage future human 
rights abuses, dei:er vigilante justice, and reinforce respect for law and the new 
democratic government. 
\1\/hile prosecutions rrllight initially provoke resis~ance, many analiysts 
believe that national reconciliation cannot take place as Xong as justice is 
foreclosed. As Professor Cherif Bassiouni, then ChainiJ.an of the U.N. 
Investigative Commission for Yugoslavia, stated in 1996, "[i]f peace is not 
intended to be a brief interlude between conflicts," U:hen it must be accompalOl]ed 
-· . . . 31 by JUStice. -
Failure to prosecute leaders responsible for huma.n rights abuses breeds 
contempt for the law and encourages future violations. The U.N. Commission 
on Human Rights and! its Sub-Commission on Prevention ofDiscri.roination311d! 
Protection of lv1[inorities have conchi!dedl that imp1.mity is one of the main 
reasons for the contiml!ation of grave violations oHmmalDl rights throughout the 
'Norld. 34 Fact finding reports on Chile and JEJ SaJvadlor indlkate that tlhe 
grarHing of mrmesty or de facto iJr!!1p1Jnilty lhe;s Red! to an increase in abuse::: i.n 
those cmmtries.35 
31. S::e I\t£IJ·JC'l1, :;~.~pra note 26, u.t g (contending th&t prosecu:ticn:; "arc slo\~v', pwtln1, and 
narrow"). 
33. l'vf. Cherif Bassiouni, Searching for Peace and Achieving Justice: The Need for 
Accoumabi/ity, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 9, 13 (1996). 
34. UJ-L Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Comm'n on Human Rights, WorkingGmup 
on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances, Report on the Consequences of Impunity,'][ 34-4, 
U.N. Doc. E/Cl\1.41!990/13 (Jan. 24, 1990), reprinted in 3 TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE: How 
EMERGING DEMOCRACIES RECKON WITH FORMER REGIMES 18, 19 (l\1. Kritz ed., 1995). 
35. U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Protection of Human Rights in Chile,'][ 341, 
U.N. Doc. AJ38/385 (Oct 17, 1983). 
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Further, history teaches that fonner leaders given am.nesty or exile are 
prone to recidivism, resorting to corruption and violence and becoming a 
disn.rprivt in:t1uence on the peace process. From his seasiae villa ia Ca.iabar, 
Nigeric;, for e;c?.mp!e, Charles Taylor orchestrated a failed &ssassinal:ion plot in 
2005 against President Lansana Conte of Guine&., a neighboring country tba~ 
had backed the rebel movement that forced Taylor from power.36 
VVhat a fleW or reinstated democracy needs mosi is legitimacy, which 
requires a fair, credible, and transparent account of what wok place and vvho 
was responsible. Criminal trials (especially those involving proof of 
widespread and systematic abuses) can generate a comprehensive record ofthe 
nature and extent of violations, how they were planned and executed, the f::;te. 
of individual victims, who gave the orders, and who carried them out. ")lhilc 
there are various means to develop the historic record of such ::tbuses, the mos: 
authoritative rendering of the truth is possible only through the crucible nf a 
trial that accords fuli due process. Supreme Court Justice Robert Jaclc:;s:;,, th::: 
Chief Prosecutor at Nuremberg, underscored the logic of this proposition vvhen 
he repmied that the most importa..11t legacy of the Nuremberg trials was the 
documentation of Nazi atrocities "with such authenticity and in wch dst::>il th2t 
!here can be no responsible denial of these crimes in the future. "37 According 
to Jackson, the est<lbiishment of an authoritative record of 8.busts th;:,~ \;,iu•jld 
endure the test of time and vvithstand the challenge of revisionisrn required 
proof of "incredible events by credible evidence. "38 
In addition to truth, there is a responsibility to provide justice. ·while ::, 
Slat:e nw.y appropr.iatdy forgive crimes against itself, such as treason or sedition,. 
serious crimes against persons, such as rape a!i1d murder, are an altogethe:l-
dlifferent matter. Holding the violators accow"!talblr:: for their acts is a ml:lr3l duty 
ovv·ed to the victims and! "their fanrili.es. Prosecuting and ptmio.hing l11e 'iiol.cSo:ts 
1~ould give sign]f]cance to the victims~ suffering and serve 2s .2 p.Br~i.BJ :F::Yr:t::d.~/ 
lGo! their ]njuries. IVJioreover~ prosecutions help res~ore -·.,;ict~ros; d·!gni~y .~~nd 
36. See Lizzti, supra note 6~ at 1G (citing an intelligence repon prepared by ir~vestigatDr:; 
for the ::;pecial Cour< for Sierra Leone). In response, the U.N. Security Council adopted 
P.e~c.;lution I 532~ v~:hich required an states to freeze Charles Tay!or~s assets in order to pr':'.:vent 
him from further engaging "in activities that undermine peace and stability in Liberia and the 
region." S.C. Res. 1532, pmbl.. U.H. Doc. S/RES!l532 (l\llar. 12, 2004). 
37. Repon from Justice Robert H. Jackson, Chief of Counsel for the tJr;ited :::.t?J::s in the 
Prosecution or Axis V.far Criminals, to the President (Oct. 7, 1946), in 20 TEMPLE L.Q. 338,. 2·'-!3 
(] 946). 
38. Report from Justice Robert H. Jackson, Chief of Counsel for the United States in the 
Prosecution of Axis War CrimJnals, to the President (June 7, 1945), in 39 P.J,1. J. IN~''- L 172, 
184 (Supp. 1945). 
F'ROM THE eXILE FILES 34-9 
prevent private acts of revenge by those who, in the absence of justice, would 
take it into their own hands.39 
While prosecution and punishment can reinforce the value of law by 
displacing personal revenge, failure to punish former leaders responsible for 
widespread human rights abuses encourages cynicism about the rule of law 
and distrust toward the political system. To the victims of human rights 
crimes, an:tiJ.esty or exile represents the ultimate in hypocrisy: While they 
struggle to put their suffering behind them, those responsible are allowed to 
enjoy a comfortable retirement. When those with power are seen to be 'tbove 
the iaw, the ordinary citizen win never come to believe nn tthe principle of the 
rule of law as a fundamental necessity in a society transitioning to 
democracy. 
fiilaHy, vvhere the United Nations or major countries give their 
imprimatur to an amnesty or exile deal, ~here is a risk that leaders lin odner 
parts cf the v;;orld wm be encouraged to engage in gross abuses. lFm 
example, history records that the international amnesty given to the Turkish 
officials responsible for the massacre of over one minion Armenians during 
Wvrld Wax 1 encouraged Ado]f Hider some twenty years later to conclude 
that Germany could pursue his genocidal policies with impunity. In a 1939 
speech to his reh1ctant Genera! :Staff, Hitler remarked, "Who after aH is today 
speaking about the destrucdon of the Armenians?"40 Richard Goldstone, the 
former Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for the forrner 
Y Egosl11viE.J., bas conduded that "the faihue of the international[ comrnunity to 
prosecute lPollPot, Idi Amin, Saddam Hussein and Moh.arilimed Aididl, among 
others, encouraged the Serbs to launch their policy of ethnic cleansing in tliie 
former Yugosbvia with the expe:ctaition !thai: tlhey would noli: be held 
accmmtabk :for their ]ntemationa~ criKI]eS. "41 Vvhen the intemationaK 
·~·~~~~:ruun~ty e:Jteo~_rr:2J_ge:s .f.)t GH(lorscs an EiTICUll1Csty D,&' e;~jlic deal~ i~ seunds a .signa] 
tc other rogicle regirnes Ihai: they !fllave no([Jhilllig Ito ]ose by nns~ituiciRng repressive 
measures; if things start going !bad]y, ~hey can allways bargain aw<J>.y therr 
:;_·tsponsioHity for crimes by agreeing to peace. 
39. Haitian citizens, for e:xample, have commitietl acts of violence agai!!1st the fonnc;;· 
members of the brutal military regime who were given amnesty for their abuses. Gary Borg, 
F o:·;.~~q:·,. Haitian Gc:n:!ta! i;;· Chtaned Do-wn in Streei~ Cl-!1. TRIB., Oct ·4, ! 995, at 4. 
40. Adolf Hitler, Speech to Chief Commanders and Commanding Generals (Aug. 22., 
1939), quoted in M. CHERIF l3ASSIOUNI, CRIIVJES AGAINST HUMANITY IN lNTER[,lAT!ONAL 
CRJMINALLAW 176 n.96 (]992). 
L.} l. Ivnichac1 Scharf, Th.e ~Case for a .Pennunent lnrei··nationci Tn1.th C'oiiliEission, '/ D~uE.E 
J. ·C:OMP. & INT'LL. 375, 393 ii1.128 (1997). 
i ~ .. 
350 63 VVA.SH. &: LEE L. REV. 339 (2006) 
lll. The Limited International Legal Obligation to Prosecute 
lL11 a few narrovvly defined situations (described below) there is an 
internationaliegal obligation to prosecute regard!ess of the underlying practical 
considerations. Where this is the case, failure to prosecute can amount to an 
international breach. An ami'lesty or asylum given to the members of the 
former regime could be invalidated in a proceeding before either the state's 
domestic courts42 or an international forum. 43 International support for such an 
amn.esty or asylum deal would undermine international respect for and 
adherence to the treaties that require prosecution. Finally, it would be 
inappropliate for an international criminal court to defer to a national amnesty 
or asylum in a situation vvhere the anmesty or asylum violates obligations 
conte2ined in the very international conventions that make up the court's subject 
matter jurisdiction. 
A. Crimes Defined in International Conventions 
The prerogative of states to issue fu! am_nesty or grant asylum for an 
offense can be circumscribed by treaties to which the states axe party. There are 
several international conventions that dearly provide for a du[y to prosecute the 
humanitaxian or human 1ights crimes defined therein, including in particular the 
grave breaches provisions of the 1949 Geneva Conventions,44 the Genocide 
6.? When the South A..frican amnesty scheme was challenged on the grounds that it 
violated the rights of families to seek judicial redress for the murders of !heir loved ones, the 
newly created Constitutional Court rejected the claim on the ground that neither the South 
African Constituiion nor any applicable treaty prevented granting amnesty in exchange for truth. 
Se-e f~:anian Peoples ()rg. 11. Presidei1t ofS. Afr. 1996 (4) S/\ 671 (C'C) ~f 50 (0. J\:f!.), G·~~.:;.ilc.!I:/~ 
at http://www.constitutionalcourt.org.za/Archimages/2529.PDF ("[T]he epilogue to the 
Constitution authorised and contemplated an 'am.nesty' in its most comprehensive and generous 
meaning."). A chailenge to the Argentinian amnesty law fared better. In fv'iarch 2001, an 
Argentinian judge declared the amnesty law unconstitutional and in violation of internation<:>.! 
lavi, e1 decision confirmed in P:,ugust 2003 vvhen .AJgentina's Parlimnent voted to a:1nul tb::: 
amnesty law. Debora Rey, Argentina Approves Ending Laws on Amnesty, VI/ASH. POST, Aug. 
2'2, 2003, at A.16. As this P..sticle went to press, a lawsuit was winding its way through the 
courts of Nigeria, seeking to strike down the asylum granted to Charles 'fay lor on the ground 
that it violated Nigeria's obligations under international and domestic law to prosecute and deny 
asylum to perpetrators of war crimes and crimes against humanity. James A. Goldston, Some 
Quiet Victories for Human Rights, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Dec. 22, 2005, at 3. 
43. "Challenges to amnesty laws enacted in Argentina, El Salvador, Suriname, and 
Uruguay have been lodged with the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights of the 
Organization of American States." Diane F. Orentlicher, Set!ling Accounts: The Duty to 
,"'rose ewe FhiiiWn Rights Fiolaiions of a Friar Regime, IOO YALE L..i. 2537, 2540 n.5 (1991 ). 
44. Geneva Convention for the A~rnelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick 
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Convention,45 and the Torture Convention.46 Vvhen these Conventions are 
applicable, the granting of anmesty or asylum to persons responsible for 
cominitting the crimes defined therein would constitute a breach of a treaty 
obiigation for which there can be no excuse or exception. H is noteworthy, 
however, that these Conventions were negotiated in the context of the Cold 
War and by design apply only to a na.rrow range of situations, as such 
limitations were necessary to ensure widespread adoption. 
1. The 1949 Geneva Conventions 
The four Geneva Conventiolills were negotiated in 1949 to codify, inter 
alia, the international rules relating to the treatment of prisoners of war and 
civilians dming am1ed conflict and in occupied tenitory after a war. Almost 
every country of the world is party to these conventions. Each of the Geneva 
Conventions contains a specific enumeration of "grave breaches," whidht are 
war climes under international ]aw for which there is individual crirrlJinaM 
liability and for which states have a conesponding duty to prosecute or 
extradite. Grave breaches include willful killing, torrure or inhumru1 trearnnent, 
wiHfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health, extenslive 
desi:ruction of property not justified by rrulitary necessity, willf11.illy depriving a 
civilian of the Iights of fair and regular trial, &.i!d un!awful confinement of a 
civilian. 47 
lP'lli""ties to the Geneva Conventions have an obligation to search for, 
prosectJte,. and punish perpetmtors of grave breaches of tlhe Ge!D!e'm 
O:mveR1tions, or to hand over Sl.lclhl persons for trial by another sli:ate parity. The 
in P...rmed Forces in the Field art. 49, Aug. 12., 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter 
Ger!eva Convention I]; Geneva Convention for the A.rne!ioration of the Com!ition of th"-
\7Jounded, Sick aDd Shipwrecked Members of Armed !Forces at Sea art. 50, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 
IJ.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Geneva Convention H]; Geneva Convention Relative 
tc tbe Treatmer;t ofPrisor;ers of War art. 129, Aug. 12, J9t!8, 6 U.S. 'f. 3316,75 U.N.T.S. 135 
[hereinafter Geneva Convention HI]; and Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of 
Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 146, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 
[hereinafter Geneva Convention !V]. 
45. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Ctime of Genocide art liV, Dec. 
9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 [hereinafter Genocide Convention]. 
46. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, InJmman or Degrading Treatment or 
i3 unishment art. 7, opened for signature Feb. 4, 1985, S. Treaty Doc. I\fo. 100-20 (1988), 1465 
U.N.T.S. l 13, reprinted in 23 I.L.M. 1027 (1984), as modified, 24 LL.M. 535 (1984) (entered 
into force June 26, 1987) [hereinafter Torture Convention]. 
47. Geneva Convention I, supra note 4-4, art. 50; Geneva Convention H, sZJpra !iiO!e -<!t!., 
art. 51; ~Geneva ~convention ~I[, sL!prC! note 4Lt-, art. ~ 30; Geneva Convention K\l,. supra note !!..tJ~ 
art. 1 L~.7. 
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Corrnnentc;.ry to the Geneva Conventions, which :is the official hisl':ory of the 
negotiations leading to the adoption of these treaties, confirms that the 
obligation to prosecute grave breaches is "absolute," meaning, inter alia, thai: 
state parties can under no circumstances grant perpetratots iw_munity or 
r · r - • f t.. r< • 48 amnesty xrom prosecutwn ror grave breaches o_ t•ne t..'o:nvenuons. 
It is important to recognize that while states or international tribunals may 
prosecute persons -v:;ho commit war crimes in internal armed conflicts, t!Je duty 
to prosecute grave breaches under the Geneva Conventions is limited to the 
context of international armed conflict. Further, there is a high threshold of 
violence necessa:oy to constitute a genuine mmed conflict, as distinct from lovver 
]eve! disturbances such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of fighting, or 
unilateral abuses coint-nitted by a government in the absence of widespread 
armed resistance by the target population.49 Moreover, to be an international 
.Brmed conflict, the situation must constitute an armed conflict involving two or 
more states, Of a partial or toLal occupation of the territory of one state by 
2,nother.50 
In contrast ito the duty to prosecute grave breaches occuning in an 
international anned conflict, with respect to internal armed conflict amnesties 
are not only permitted, but are encouraged by Article 6(5) of Additional 
Protocol IK51-a point the South African Constitutiorl3J Court stressed i!r 
finding that the arn.11esties granted by the Truth and Reconciliation CmrLmission 
48. VIRGINIA MORRIS & MICHAEL P. SCHARF, AN INSIDER'S GUIDE TO THE INTERNAT!Ol>!Al 
CRllvl!NALCOURTFORTHEFORMEP. YUGOSUV!i'. 114-15 & n.356, 34·1 (1995) (quoting GENEVA 
CONVENTION FOR THE PJ\1ELIORATION OF THE CONDITION OF THE WOUNDED AND SICK IN ARMED 
FORCES U~ THE FIELD: COMMENTARY 373, cmt. to art. 51 (J. l?ictet eel.,] 952)); see also THEODOR 
iVIERON, HUMAN RIGHTS /J-10 HUMANITARIAN NORMS AS CUSTOMARY LAW 2!0 (1989) (noting 
rhat the universality principle of jurisdiction, on which the grave breaches clauses of the <Geneva 
Conventions are based, requires states to prosecute or extradite those charged with committing 
grave breaches). 
49. See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 Aug. !949, and Relating to 
th<5 lt.'mtection of Victims of Non-linternational P.,.rmed Conflicts (Protocol H) art. 1 (2), Jlune B, 
l S77, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 [hereinafter Additional Protocol H) (stating that the Protocol "shall 
noi apply to siruations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots [and] isolated and 
sporadic acts of violence 0 ). Bltt see Iv11chae] P. Scbart De_firzing Terrori::;n aa lhe ~Peacei.iiiiC 
Equi11alent ofWa;· Crimes: Problems and Prospects, 36 CASEW. REs. J.JNT'LL. 359, 365-67 
(2004) (citing the Inter-American Comznission on Human Rights' 1997 decision in}tWI1 Carlos 
Abeiia v. Arge;1tiiw, Case 1 Ll37, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 55/97, OEA/Ser.L/V /U.?8, 
doc. 6 rev. 1['l! 155-56 (!997), and the United States response to the 9/l i attacks as 
developments that have sought to lower the armed conflict threshold). 
50. Geneva Conventions I, H, HI, and rv, supra note 44, art. 2. 
5 i. Additional Protocol H, supra note 49, art. 6(5) ("At the end of hostilities, the 
authoriries in power shall endeavor to grant the broadest possible amnesty to persons vvho have 
participated in the armed con:t1ict, or those deprived of their liberty for reasons related to the 
anned conflict, wnether they are intemed or detained."). 
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did not violate international 1aw.52 The rationale for this prov1swn is to 
encourage reconciliation, which is of greater importance in nonintemational 
armed conllicts where patrolable international borders do not exist between 
former enemies. Thus, the Commentary on the Protocol, prepared by the 
International Com.~!littee of the Red Cmss, states: "The object of this sub-
pamgraph is to encourage gestures of reconciliation which can contribute to 
reestablishing normal relations in the life of a nation which has been divided. "53 
The Geneva Conventions, then, would require prosecution of Saddam 
Hussein for acts co:t1L'llitted during the international armed conflicts involving 
llran, Kuwait, and the 1991 Persian Gulf War. They vvould not, however, 
c·equire prosecution of Charles Taylor, who is accused only of complicity in wm-
crimes dming the: internal armed conflict in Sien·a Leone. 
2. The Genocide Convention 
Most of the countries of the world are pm1y to the Genocide Convenl!:icm, 
\vhich eutered into force on January 12, 1952,, and the Xntemational Court of 
j;ustice has determined that the substantive provisions of the Convention 
constitute customary international law binding on aU states. 54 Like the Geneva 
Con\7enticns, the Genocide Convention provides an abso!ute obligation to 
prosen;te persons responsible fer genocide as defined in the. Conventimi.55 
The Genocide Convention defines genocide as one of the foHovving acts 
'"'hsn ceor_ni.-rJHec! "with intent to destroy, in whole or in plli--t, a national, 
ethnicaL racial or religious group, as such:" 
52. k.anian Peoples Org. v. President ofS. Afr. 1996 (4J SA 67 l (CC) ')[ 30 (S. Afr.). 
J..:;. C'LAUDE flLLOUD ET AL.) COivEvfENTARY ON THE fWDITIOi,J.CJ. PROTOCOLS OF g .YUNE 
1977 TG THE GENEVA COI,IVENT!Ol'IS OF 12 AUGUST 1949., at 1402 (1987). 
5LJ.. See Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punish;nent of the Crime of 
r.Jt:-.nr_y_:id~. A.dvi2ory ()pini:JD, 1951 !.C.l 15, 23 (lVl&y 22) (stating that the CoDventic,r,'s 
principks are binding on states, "even without any conventional obligation"). 
55. Article IV of the Genocide Convention states: "Persons committing genocide or aay 
of the acts enumerated in ::rrtic!e HI shall be punished, whether they are consiitutionally 
;-esponsible rulers, public officials or private individuals." Genocide Convention, supra note 45, 
art. IV. Article V of the Genocide Convention requires states to "provide effective penalties" 
for persons guilty of genocide. ld. art. V. Article V1 of the Genocide Convention requires 
prosecution by the st::ne jn V:'hose territory genocide occurs oi· in an iniernai·ional court 
established for this purpose. ld. art. VI. While ,A _ rtic!e VI suggests that only the territorial state 
and srale parties to an iilternational criminal court have an obligation to prosecute rhe crime of 
genocide, other states would still be bound to extradite an individual accused of genoi.:ide ifthey 
are not able to prosecute. Therefore amnesty or exile/sanctuary for pr::ace de8.ls wo•_d_d bF. 
manifestly inconsistent with the obligations of the Genocide Cm1Vention. 
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(a) IGlling members of the group; 
(b) Causing serious bodily or menta! harm to members of the group; 
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions oflife calculated to bring 
about its physical destruction in whole or in part; 
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; 
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.56 
There are several important limitations inherent in this definition. Frrst, to 
constitute genocide, there must be proof that abuses were committed with the 
specific intent required by the Genocide Convention. It is not enough that 
abuses were intended to repress opposition; the intent must be literally to 
destroy a group of people. Second, and even more importantiy, the victims of 
such abuses must constitute a group of one of the four specific types 
enumerated in the Genocide Convention, naJ."lrJ.ely, national, ethnic, racial, or 
religious. In this respect, it is noteworthy that the drafters of the Genocide 
Convention deliberately excluded acts directed against "political groups" from 
the Convention··s definition of genocide. 57 
The Genoc]de Convention would require prosecution of Saddam Hussein, 
who has been accused of ordering attacks aimed at destroying the I'-Jorthem 
tragi Kurds and the Southern Iraqi Marsh .A.xabs as a people, resulting in 
hundreds of ltbous&JJ.ds of casualties. Charles 'fay lor, in contrast, has not been 
accllllsed of acts of genocide. 
3. The Torture Convention 
The Tonture tCo,-,ven"Liorn entered! into force on .June 2:6, 1927, and cmTently 
lh 1 '}a _.. ss T'- r _ ,., , .-::· "·' , " . ~-;as _ .Jo pal! nes. i ue -O~{Venuon .ae.nn.es lLOrture as. 
56. Genocide Convention, supra note 45, art. li; Rome Statute for the Internationai 
Criminal Court art. 6, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute], available at 
l! tq] :/ /www. un. org!Ia w/icc/statute/engiish/rome _statute( e). pdf. 
57. The exclusion of "political groups" was due in large part to the fact that the 
Convention was negotiated during the Cold \i\far, during which the Soviet Union and other 
totalitarian governments feared that they would face interference in their inie.rna! affairs if 
genocide were defined to include acts comJ!litted to destroy political groups. According to 
Professor Kuper, "one may fairly say that the deiegares, after all, represented govemments in 
power, and that many of these governments wished to retain an unrestricted freedom to suppress 
political opposition." L. KUPER, GENOCIDE 30 (1982). 
58. Office of the United Nations High Com..11issioner for Human JP.Jghts, Status of the 
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any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is 
intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him 
or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or 
a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or 
intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on 
discrilT'inztion of any kind, when such pain m suffering is inflicted by or at 
the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or 
other person acting in an official capacity. It does not include pain or 
suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions.59 
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The Torture Convention requires each state party to ensure that all acts of 
torture ::tre offenses undler its intemali law60 and! to establish its jurisdiction over 
such offenses in cases where the accused is found in its i:eu!tory,61 ai1d if such a 
state does not extradite the alleged offender, the Convention requires it to 
submit the case to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution. 62 
Persons convicted of torture are to be subjected to harsh sentences 
proportionate to the grave nature of the offense. 63 
The Special Court for Sierra Leone charged Charles Taylor with 
comrnitting c1imes against humanity in Sierra Leone, including compliciiy in 
widespread and systematic acts of torture, from 1991-1999.64 Notably, 
however, neither Sierra Leone (the state where the acts of torture occurred), 
Liberia (the state of nationality of the accused), nor Nigeria (the state vvhere 
Charles Taylor was given asylum) were parties to the Torture Convention when 
'i:he acts of torture in Sien·a Leone were cormnitted.65 And although the United 
Ratification of the Convention Against Torture, http://www.ohchr.org/english!law/cat-ratify.htm 
(lasi visited Nov. 22, 2005) [hereinafter Torture Convention Ratification Status]. 
59. Torture Convention, supra note 46, art. !. 
60. Id. art. .!(.. Article L!. also requires parties to crimina!ize acts which "constitute[] 
complicity or participation in torture." !d. 
61. Id. art. 5. 
62. ld. art. 7. 
63. According to the negotiating record of the Torture Convention, "[i]n applying ai'i:icle 4 
[which requires states to make torture "punishable by appropriate penalties which take into 
ascot1!1t their grav~ nature~" Torture Con~.rentior., supra note t!.6, a.rt. l!.J, it seem~ re:nsonable tc 
require ... that the punishment for torture should be close to the penalties applied to the most 
serious offenses under the domestic legal system." J.lBURGERS & H. DANEL!US, T!-tE UNITED 
NATIONS CONVEI'IT!ON AGA_lNST TORTURE 129 (1988). 
6L!. Prosecutor v. Cha.rles Ghankay Taylor, Case No. SCSL-2003-0l-K, Indictment,']['][ 2.9-
31 (Mar. 7, 2003), available at http://www.sc-sl.org/Documents/SCSC-03-0l-I-OOl.pdf. 
65. The acts of tOrture alleged in the Special Court for Sierra Leone's indictment of 
Charles Taylor occurred from 1991 to 1999. Sierra Leone ratified the Torture Convention on 
Apr. 25, 2001; Nigeria ratified the Convention on July 28, 2001; Liberia ratified the Convention 
on Sept. 22, 2004; and the United States ratified the Convention on Oct. 2i, 1994-. See Torture 
Convention Ratification Status, supra note 58 (listing ratifying states). 
II 
1,, 
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States, \Vhich helped broker the exile-for-peace deal, was a party to the Tonure 
Convention during that time, the requirements of the convention are nm 
applicable to <he United States in this case because the acts of torl:ure did not 
occur in U.S. cen-itory, the offender was not a national of the United States, and 
the offender was not present in U.S. territory. 66 Under the Vienna Co!tVeGciGE 
on the Law of Treaties, the provisions of a treaty "do not bind a party in relation 
to any act or fact which took place ... before the date of the entry into force of 
the treaty with respect to that-party." 67 Consistent with the Vienna Convention 
as well as the reasoning of the British High Court in tt"le Pinochet case, the 
obligations to prosecute and to refrain from taking actions which would 
frustrate prosecution contained in the Torture Convention "0.rere not apphcab!e. 
to the case of Charles Taylor because his alleged involvement in acts of torture 
pre-dated the ratification of the Convention by the relevant states. 68 
Still, some wight argue that the Torture Convention is relevant to the 
situation involving Charles Taylor based on the ComrrJ.ttee Agaimt Torture's 
1990 decision concerning the Argentinean amnesty laws. In that case, thf.; 
Committee Against Tortme, which is the treaty body created by the Torture 
Csnv-entim1 to facilitate its implementation, decided th0.t con1Inunications 
subrriltt.ed by Argentinean citizens on behalf of their relatives who had been 
::mtured by Argentinean rnilitary amthorities were inadmissible since ;\rgentinD. 
had ratified i:he Convention only after the mm1esty laws had been enac!ed.6'' 
However, in dictum, the Committee stated "even before the entry into force of 
the Convention against Torture, there existed a general mle of internationa1lavi 
which should oblige aU states to take effective measures to prevent tortEre and 
tc punish ac!:s of torture." 70 
The Cow .. nutte:e's statement should not be mistakenly construed as 
suggest~ng that amnesties/asylum for persons vvho commit tori:lJre is 
66. See Torture Convention, supra note L!.6, art. 5 (sstting forth conditions U!!dt::.;: \;\,~t!dt ~ 
Si~f·.i.f: rrmst take action in response to Convention violations). 
67. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 28, i\llay 23, !1969, I 12. Stat. 2631-822, 
11:55 U.N.T.2. 331 [hereinafter Vienna Convention]; c.f Rome Statute, supra note 56, c.rt. 2L! 
(recognizing that the ~nternatiofiai Criminal Couri has no i·e-;xouctive ju!"isdictio~1 r~rrd :1:~~: 
obligations under the Rome Statute do not apply to crimes committed prior lo the ICC's entry 
into force in July 2002). 
68. See Regina v. Bow St. Metro. Stipendiary lVIagistrate, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (No. 
3), [2000] l A.C. 147, 148-49 (H.L. 1999) (U.K.) (hoiding that head of state immunity 
prevented prosecution or extradition of former Chilean President. Augusto Pinochet :for acts that 
predated the ratification of the Torture Convention by Chile, Spain, and the United K.ingdom). 
69. U.N. Committee Against Torture, Decision on Admissibili1y anne;, V!, ac 109-13, 
U.N. Doc. AJ45i44 (June 21, 1990). 
70. UJ·l. Can1J11ittee .Against Tortuit:.~ _Decision on .A.dn!issibiiity 3nnex ""VX~ 8t 109-13. 
U.N. Doc. J\145/44 (June 21, 1990). 
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under customary intemationallavv. By using the word "should, n the Comnlittee 
indicated that its statement was aspirational rather than a declaration of binding 
law. On the basis of its decision, the Committee urged Argentina to provide 
remedies for the victims of torture and their surviving relatives; it did not 
suggest that international law required that Argentina do so.71 Nor did it 
specify that the remedy should be prosecution of those responsible, rather L'1an 
some other appropriate remedy such as compensation. The Conu·njttee's 
decision, therefore, should not be read as indicating that the Torture 
Convention required Nigeria, Liberia, or Siena Leone to prosecute those whose 
acts of tmtwre pre-dated their ratification of the Convention. 
4. General Human Rights Conventions 
General human rights conventions include the International Covenant on 
___,. ·~ 'n 1" . • D. . 7? d ' . "l ' d1 J E ,., . ,. Uvu and! rOI:<hca! Jfi...Jghts, -an the snn.J ar!y wor ea -~uropem!Lonven;;tw;rr wr 
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,73 a..1d American 
Convention on Human Rights.74 Although these treaties do not expressly 
requixe sta~es to prosecute violators, they do obligate states to "ensure" the 
1ights enumerated therein. There is growing recognition in the jurisprudence of 
the tre2.t:y bodies responsibfe for mm1itor]ng eJ'!!forcemen1t of tlhese conven~ions 
andl the writings of respected cmmnentators that the duty to ensure nights 
implies a ch.rty to hold specific violators accoumtable.75 
7L !d. at 1 11. 
72. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signatl!re Dec. i 6, 
1966, 6 LL.i\lli. 368, 999 U.N.'f.S. 171. The International Covenant cmrently ba,; l:'A parties, 
inchH.iing both t.iberiB. m1d J'Jigeria. 1)ffice of the United 1'-Tations High (~ow_rnissioner for 
liu.tTian Rights, R'at~ficarions a;td Resen;ajfons: Intcr;z~..'!tionai Covzncnt on Civil Gnd p·:.,·/iric::r.! 
Rights, http://www.ohchr.org/english/countries/ratificationN.htm (last visited Dec. I 6, ::W05). 
"/3. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221. 
74. .(Jrganlzation of A1Tterican States, it..tHci·ica!i Con-"'cn~ion ,:,Jj I-Ium&i"l P.Jghts, .. ~.ic~t::d 
Nov. 22, 1969, O.AS. T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123. 
75. See Yoram Dinstein, The Right to Life, Physical Integrity, and l..iber(v, iii THE 
INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS 114, 119 (Louis Henkin eel., ! 981) (arguing that parties to the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights arguably must e;leTcise due diligence !0 
prevent intentional depriva!ion oflife by individuals, "as we!! as to apprehend murderers and to 
prosecute them in order to deter future takings of life"); Orentlicher, supra note 8, at 2568 
(arguing that states have a duty to bring torturers to justice); Thomas JBuergenthal, To Respect 
nnd To Ensure: State Obligations and Pennissible Derogations, in T!-lEINTERNAT!Ot<ALBILLOF 
RIGHTS 72, 77 {Louis Henkin ed., 1 981) ("[The] obligation to 'ensure' rigbts creates affirmative 
obJigations on Lhe state-for e~~ample, to discipline its offic!a1s. 11 ). 
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Yet, a careful examination of the jurisprudence of these bodies suggests 
thai: methods of obtaining specific accountability other than criminal 
prosecutions would meet the requirement of "ensuring rights. "76 This 
jurisprudence indicates that a state must fulfill five obligations in confronting 
gross violations of human rights committed by a previous regime: 
0) investigate the identity, fate, and whereabouts of victims; (2) investigate 
the identity of major perpetrators; (3) provide reparation or compensation to 
victims; (4) take affirmative steps to ensure that human rights abuse does not 
recur; and (5) punish those guilty of human rights abuse. Punishment can 
take many noncriminal forms, including imposition of fines, removal from 
office, reduction of rank, forfeiture of government or mJlitary pensions, and 
exHe. 
B. Crimes Against Humanity 
1. Definition 
As developed in the jurisprudence of the Nuremberg Tribunal and 
codified in the Statutes of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugos]avlia, 77 the baemational Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 78 the Special 
76. See Schan.", supra note l 0, at 49-51 (criticizing conclusion that decisions of the Inter-
/~-rnerican Court and Comrnission establish criminal prosecution as the only pei'Illissible remedy 
for violations of the American Convention); Velasquez Rodriguez Case, 1988 Inter-Am. Ct. 
H.R. (ser. C) No.4, Judgment ~I'll 164, 194 (July 29, 1988) (reaching disposition of case without 
ordering crimina! prosecution); Hermosilla v. Chile, Case 10.843, Anter-A1n. C.H.R., Report. 
No. 36/96, OEJVSer.UV/H.95, doc. 7 rev. 'Jl'll 57, 63, 66,77 (1996) (finding that Chile's grant of 
amnesty and failure to investigate related disappearances violated /unerican Convention because 
they foreciosed victims' fawJlies' rights to pursue their own criminai and civil remedies); 
Orayece v. Chile, Case 11.505 et al., !nter-/Lm. C.H.R, Report No. 25/98, OEJ1Jser.UV/H.98, 
doc. 6 rev. U 60-71 (1998) (making similar findings regarding Chile's violation of duty to 
inves~igate and to provide victims and families with judicial remedies); Espinoza v. Chile, Case 
H.725, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 133/99, OEJlJSer.UV/TI.l06, doc. 3 rev. n 79-107 
(2000) (making similar findings). For a summary of several relevant decisions of inlernational 
and regional human rights bodies, see U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Sub-Comm. on 
i?'reve!iition of Discrimination & Prot. of Minorities, Study Conceming the Right to Resti/laion, 
Cornpensation and Rehabilitation for Victims of Gross Violations of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, 'll'll 50-92, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/SUl3.2/1993/8 (July 2, 1993) (submitted 
by Theo van Boyen), reprinted in 59 LAW & CONTEiviP. PROBS. 284, 303-24 (1996). 
77. The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of 
Sec!!rity Council Reso!l!tion 808, annex, delivered to the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2570"~ 
(May 3, 1993). 
78. S.C. Res. 955, annex art. 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994). 
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Court for Sierra Leone,79 and tlhe Rome Statute for the Kntema~ional 
Crimina} Court, 80 crimes against humanity are defined as: 
any of the following acts when committed as part of a widespread or 





(d) Deportation or forcible transfer of population; 
(e) Imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty in 
violation of fundamental mks of intemationallaw; 
(f) Torture; 
(g) Rape, sexual slave1y, enforced prostill.ltion, forced pregnancy, 
enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence of 
comparable gravity; 
(h) Persecutions against any identifiable group or coHectivii:y on 
political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender, or other 
gmunds that are universally recognized! as impermissible 1.1nder 
international law, in connection vvith any act refened to in this 
paragraph or any crime within the jurisdiction of the Court; 
(i} Enforced d!isappeairance of p<::Irsons; 
(j) 'fhe crime of dpartheid!; 
(k) Other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionallly causing 
great suffering, or serious i.njmy to body or to mental or physical 
heahh. 2 ! 
States are required Io proseclJite g-rave breaches of the Geneva Conven~ions 
and! the crime of gel!11ocide, !Jut there exists li]]O treaty requiring pmsec:t.!tiont of 
79. Statute of the Special Court for Siena Leone, art. 2, http://www.sc-sl.org/scsl-
statute.html (last visited Nov. 13, 2005). 
80. Rome Statute, supra note 56, art. 7. 
8L E.g., id. 
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crimes against humanity (except for torture where the state is pmty to the 
Torture Convention at the time the crime is committed); crimes against 
humanity are purely a creature of customary international1aw.82 Traditionolly, 
those who corrmritted crimes against humanity were treated like pirates, as 
hostis humani generis (an enemy of all humankind), and any state, including 
their own, could punish them through its domestic courts. 83 In the absence of a 
treaty containing the aut dedere aut judicare (extradite or prosecute) principle, 
this so called "universal jurisdiction" is generally thought to be permissive, not 
mandatory. Yet several commentators and human rights groups have recently 
taken the position that customary international law (and the notion of jus 
cogens-meaning peremptory norms) not only establishes permissive: 
jurisdiction over perpetrators of crimes against humanity, but also requires their 
prosecution and conversely prohibits the granting of at1111esty or asylum to such 
84 
perSOt1S~ 
2. 1C:ustonzary lntern.ational Latv 
J;,Jotwithstanding the chimerical conclusions of some scholars, there is 
scant evidence that a rule prohibiting amnesty or asylum in cases of crimes 
against !nt!manity has ripe!iied into ~ comp<.dsory nonT.! of custonKay 
intemmiona! law. CIUistomary in~ernationa1law, 'Which is just as binding upon 
t'tates <IS treaty hn:v, arises fmm "a general and consistent practice of states 
foHmJVed by them frmn a sense of Xegal obligation" referred to as opinio }iwis. 35 
Urrncier ~raditiona1 notions of Cl.ilstomary intemational law, "deeds were vvhat 
-' · d nS6 y I J.. 1. • · .• 1 <Xl·FJH~e1'-'!., not JUSt WOK S. _ et [ll10Se Wll!O Bul"gl.ile tl13t Cl.lS10fEKifY 1memarWl12l1 
82. The Charter of the Nuremberg War Crim~s Tribunal '.vas the first international 
instrument in which crimes against humanity were codified. See Charter of the fnteroational 
1\i.!ilitary Tribuna! annexed to the Agreement for ihe Prosecution and Punishment of iV1Fjor ·war 
Criminals ofthe European A..xis, Aug. 8, 1945,59 Stat. I54A, 82 U.N.T.S. 279, as arilended by 
Br:=:r~Rn P~otoco! cf tDct 6, I 945, reproduced in \VIRGINIA l\~10RRIS 8L IVi!CHAEL P. ScHARF~ 2 'I'HE 
lNTERHATlOi~AL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA 473-80 (!998). 
o-1. J'.JaonU R.obt-AlTiaza, Sources in lntern.alional Trel.Jties of an fJbiigation to 
lm:esri gate, Prosec!!le and Provide Redress, inl"MPUNITY AND HUI\t!Ai'l P.JGHTS Il'! li\YfERNAT!Ol'!Al. 
LA Vi AI·.JD PRACT!CE 25 (N. Roht-Arriaza ed., 1995). 
[SL!.. See sup;~a. note 8 (coHecting sources). 
85. EESTATEMENT ('fi-ll:RD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UN!TE.D STATES 
§ !02(2) ( 1937); see also Statute of the ~ntemational Court of Justice art. 38(1 ){b), June 26, 
L945, 59 Stat. l03l, l 051, available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/ibasicdocuments.htm 
(providing that sources of international law applied by the court include "intematio!.Jal custom, 
a.s evidence of a general practice accepted as law"). 
86. Bnmo Simma, lntemationai Human Rights and Genero.l lmernational Lmv: A 
~Cainpai~ative !'!i1alysis, in4 CBook 2) COLLECTED!COURSES OFTff..EA.cPnEivlY oFEUROPEANLAVJ 
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law urec1udes am.Ilestv/exiJe for crimes against humanity base their position on 
non;momg Generat Assembly resolt.Jtions, 87 hort~tive decla~ations of 
. . - c 88 ' . . - . - . 1 -22iterTis.t;cnal. comerences, ana mtematwna! conventiOns that are not Vv1Ge1y 
rTti:fied, 89 rather than on any extensive state practice consistent with such a m1e. 
153. 216 (1995). 
87. See, e.g., Declaration on Territorial Asylum, G.A. Res. 2312 (XXII), 8rt. 4 U.N. 
Cr-\OR, 22d Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. AJ6716 (Dec. l, 1967) (stating that the righc io 
asyium n;ay not be i1woked for crimes contrary to the purposes and plinciples of the 'United 
N::ttion.':l; Question of the Punishment ofi..:Var Criminals and of Persons Who Have Committed 
Crimes Against Eumanity, G.A. Res. 2712 (XXV), 'J[ 3, U.N. GAO'R, 25th Sess., Supp. Nc·. 28, 
U..N. DPr.:. AJ8028 (Dec. 15, 1970) (adopted 55-4 with thirty-three abstentions) (condenming 
crimes against humanity and calling "upon the States concerned to bring to trial persons guilty 
c.-i ccK:b crimes"); Question of ihe Punishment of War Criminals and of Persons VVho Have 
Commilled Crimes Against Humanity, G.A. Res. 2840 (XXVI), 'J[ 4, U.N. GAOR, 26th Sess., 
3upp. No. 29, U.N. Doc. A/8429 (Dec. 18, 1971) (adopted 71-0 with forty-l'.i;o abstentions) 
(affirming that a swte's refusal "to cooperate in the arrest, extradition, trial and punishment" of 
persom accused or convicred of crimes against humani!y is "contrary to the United Natiow: 
Charter and to generally recognized norms of international law"); Principles of Inter:natio;ial 
C'ooperai.ion in the Detection, Arrest, Extradition, and Punishment of Persons Guilty of ·wrJ.r 
('.:if:1!;'S flEd C;irnes PLgrrinst Humanity. G.A. P..es. 3074 cr;JCV1H), ~[ 1) UJ·T. (}A:.')~_, 28th D--:.:::5 .. 
Supp. l'-ic•. 30, iJ.i'L Doc. PJ9030 (Dec. 3, 1973) (adopted 94-0 with twenty-nine abstentions) 
(l~rovic~ing that Ct!IT1es against hun1anity 11 Shall be SUbject !-O investigation L1nd the pi:X0GfiS 
against whom there is evidence that they have committed such crimes shall be subject to tracing, 
11Test~ tr.ials and .. if found guilty~ to punishment"); :Declaration on the Prote.ction ~.\f /Ul P::r~:~n~ 
from Enforced Disappearances, G.A. Res. 47/133 pmbl., art. 14, U.N. Doc. ~V47/49, at 207,209 
(Pee. 1 8, 199'2) (equating disappearances to a crime against humanity and fi:':C)l'i.ring st"te~: i.:) ''Y 
nny person ~uspected of having perpetrated an net of enforced disappe<trance); sec- a!sc 
?rLnc!ples on th::: E[fe.ctive Pre..,'ention and Invc:;sligation ofExtr.a-legal~ A..rt~itrary and 
E:\ecln:ion::;" B.:: .. (~'. :Re~ .. 1939/65 ann~x 1[ 18, tTJ·T. D1oc. E/l939/g9: r:J 53 ·~:.::-. I9~~0) 
(r:::0c•~vJn::_~ that statr:s shaH bring to justice those accused of having particjpated in exira-legaL 
. ·=·r Sl~f(1..!fiE:(;/ t;(ecutioJns). it is note\vorthy thai: large nur.o1b;:r.s of c·.:~t~rhr.ies :1t~~r2.jnr~r~ 
d1Eing 1/0t;;:1g on the above listed resolni:ionst and thcr::b~/ did n1et nzanifest ~hei.c ;:-~ccer~tanc(~ . .-~f 
rb: prirv:ip]e.s en•JD!.eraied th~::rein. 
[:.g. .-The final :Ded;.H'[itioP f1.Dd Programme of ./-\_ction of tbe ] 9S<:; '?lv~Lld c·vnfei•:::nct 0i!1 
B\!ITl2rl Rights Bil:'inns that 11 (S]tates should abrogate. legislation leading to jnrponity ro~· those 
ieS!-JOfJ~ible for grave vioiations of human rights such as torture and prosecute such violation;,., 
thereby providing a tinn basis for the rule oflavv." V;lor]d Conference on }-lurnar! Righ~sl ]:1ne 
]..:J-?5~ 1993, llienna J)ecln:Y!tion and Progtnintne o.f Action~[ 60, ·u.l\T. Dec. J:.)Conf.l57 /23 
\June 25. 1993). 
?.9. See, e.g .. {~onvention on the I"1on-_A.pplicabi]ity of Statutory Lirnitadons \o ~:?/a; 
._-~·r;~nes ~:jn·~l ('·d~nr:~ P:.gRl!1St I-iur:1anity, art. 1 (1;)~ done l'lov. 26, 1962, 754 U.1'.1.T.~;. 7~~ {tn!.t(•:d 
irmJ force l'·fo·.'. ll. 1970) (providing that no statutory iimitation shail apply tc crirrY:s ~!gains! 
hurnanity, inespective of the date of !heir commission). Only thirty-nine state;; hm'e r;njfied tilt 
·C:cmv~-::ntion . .E>.Je!"r if the Convention vvere n1ore vvideJy ratified, the r:rrohibitjon on E[::plying :.} 
~\t:::rute: oflirnJtaticns to crirnes against 11Lunanity is not: the equivnlent cJ'". B dut.~: tr~ r-r0E>:r:-1~:-~ ::,."1·~:~ 
·--:riit!C~. 
r· 
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Commentators often cite the 1967 U.N. Declaration on Territorial 
Asy1um90 as Lhe earliest international recognition of a legal obligation to 
prosecute perpetrators of crimes against humanity. The Declaration provides 
;:tal: "the right to seek and enjoy asylum may not be invoked by <my person with 
respect to whom there are serious reasons for considering that he ha~ CO!TIIrlittec! 
a ... crime against humanity. "91 Yet according to the historic record of this 
resolution, "[t]he majority of members stressed that the draft declaration under 
consideration was not intended to propound legal norms or to change existing 
rules of international law, but to lay down broad humanitarian and moral 
principles upon which States might rely in seeldng to unify their practices 
- .· 1 u92 . h ~, -
relmmg to asy_um. Tl11s evidences that, from the outset, Le uerreral 
Assembly resolutions concerning the prosecution of crimes against humanity 
''Vere aspirational only, and not intended to create any binding duties. 
In addition to this contrary legislative history, the trouble with an approach 
to proving the existence of customary international law that focuses so heavily 
on words is "iliat it is grown like a flower in a hot-house and ithatt it is anything 
but sure that such creatures wiil survive in the much rougher climate of actua1 
' "
93 
- d d h . . h. . state practrce. ln ee , to t e extent any state practice m t 11s area 1s 
widespread, it is the practice of granting ami1esties or asylum to those who 
cmn.rnit crimes against hmnanity.94 That the United l\Tations itself has feh free 
of legal constraints in endorsing recent aill.J.J.esty and exile-for-peace deals in 
situations involving crimes against humar1ity suggests that custornary 
international lavv has not yet crystallized in this area. The Special Court for 
Sierra Leone confinned this when it recently held that domestic amnesties for 
crimes against humanity and war crimes comrrnitted in an internal armed 
conflict were not uJm]awfu! under intemat.ional !aw.95 
90. Declaration on Territorial Asylum, G.A. Res. 2.312 (XX]]), art. i (21, U.N. G,Lt_OR, 
Sess. 24, Supp. Ho. !6, U.N. Doc. PJ6716 (Dec. 14, 1967). 
91. ld. at 8!. Even if the Declaration were binding, the prohibition on granting asylum is 
not the equivalent of a duty to prosecute, and informal sanctuary can be acccrded ·Nithout n 
fonnnl grant of asylum. 
92. 
93. 
Declaration of Territorial Asylum, 1967 U.N.Y.B. 758,759, U.N. Sale~ No. E.63.I. l. 
Simma, supra note 36, at 217. 
94. See Scharf, supra note 10, at 57-58 (citing numerous examples). 
95. Prosecutor v. Ka!lon & Kambara, Case Nos. SCSL-2004-15-AR72(lE), SC3L-2004-
l6-AR72(E), Decision on Challenge to JBrisdiction: Lome Accord A_mnesty ']17 (h1ar. 13, 
20011,), al'ailable at http:!/w·,vw.sc-sl.org/Documents/SCSL-04-15-PT-060-l.pdf & http://www. 
sc-sl.org/SCSL-04-15-PT-060-H.pdf (holding that there was no "general obligation for States to 
refrain from anmesty lavvs on these crimes .... [and that] [c]onseguently, if a State passes any 
such law, it does not breach a customary mle" (quoting ANTONJO CASSESE, INTERNATlONAL 
CRJMU~ALLAW 315 (2003))). 
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Comm.entators may point to the Secretary General's August 2004 Report 
to the Secmity Council on the Rule of Law and Transitional Jusiice as an 
indication that the United l"Tations has recently altered its position on i:he 
acceptability of amnesty/exile for peace deals. In that report, t.l:!e Secretary-
General of the United Nations said that peace agreements fu!d Security Council 
resolutions and mandates should "[r]eject any endorsement of amnesty for 
genocide, war crimes, or crimes against humanity, including those relating to 
ethnic, gender and sexually based international crimes, [and] ensure that no 
such amnesty previously granted is a bar to prosecution before any United 
Nations-created or -assisted court. "96 His more signific:mt, however, that in the 
Security Council's debate on the Secretary-General's Report, there vvas no 
consensus on this particularly controversial recommendation (only two of the 
fifteen members of t.he Council-Brazil and Costa Rica-spoke in favor of it 
'Nhile several opposed it), and the statement approved by the Council at the end 
-~f the debate made no reference to the issue of am_j_nesty. 97 
3. Jus Cogens 
The concept of jus cogens-meaning "peremptory norms"-is said to be 
among the "r11ost ambiguous and ilheoreticaHy problematic of the doctrines of 
international law. "98 Since the inception of the modem state system three and a 
half centuries ago,99 international law has been based on notions of consent 
Under this concept of jus dispositivium (positive law), states vvere bound on~y 
to treaties to which they had acceded and to those rules of customary 
international law to which they had acquiesced. The concept ofjus co gens, in 
96. The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the Rule of Law and 
:--ransiriona! Juslice in Coidlicl and p·osl-~Conjhci Socieiizs ~[ .S.:!.\ ~0 .1'-1. l)oc. ~./2004/61 f., (f\.ug. 
23~. 2004). See also U.l\l. SCOR, 59th SesG., 5052nd n1tg. at 5, tLl··,f. Doc. 8/P.i/.5051: (()ct. 6~ 
2004), for the Secretary-General's remarks to the Security Council. 
97. U.N. SCOR, 59th Sess., 5052nd mtg. at 14, U.N. Doc. S/PV.5052 (Oct. 6, 2004); 
U.I'L SCOR, 59th Sess., 5052nd mtg., Resumption 1 at 26, 37-38, U.N. Doc. SI'?'V.5052 
(Resumption 1) (Oct. 6, 2.004). 
98. Christopher A Ford, Adjudicoting Jus Cogens, J3 VVJS. Itrr'LL.J. 145, 145 (1994); 
see also JIJJthony D' Amato, D's a Bird, It's a Plane, It's Jus Co gens, 6 CoNN. J. lNT'LL. l, 1-2 
( 1990) (discussing the broad array of norms lumped under the heading jus co gens). 
99. The state system, characterized as an association of sovereign states governed by 
positive law rules to ··.vhich they must consent before they are bound, is widely believed to have 
originated with the Peace of\7ifestphalia, which ended the Thirty Years War in 1648. Stephane 
Beaulac, The Westphalian Legal OrrhodmJ'-Myth or Reality?, 2 J. HlST. INT'L L. 148, 148 
(2000). For the fuli text of the Peace of Westphalia (Osnabruck and IvJunster) Treaties, in both 
their Latin and English versions, see 1 CONSOLIDATED TREATY SERIES 119,270 (Clive PaEy ed., 
1969). 
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c:G:-:.-.trast, !0 bEsed in part on natural lavv principles that 11 IJIC1lail D\ler an.d 
invalidate international agreements and other rules of international lav/ in 
c:~;:nflict \7/ith thexn. 11100 
Though the term itself was not employed, the jus co gens concept was first 
applied by the U.S. Militfury Tribunal at Nuremberg, which declared that the 
treaty between Germany and Vichy France approving the use of French 
prisc~aer~s c~f \:v·ar in the Gennan aa-mar-nents industry \Vas void under 
. . - , - ( r - - - ) ]Qi 
mternat10na1 la'-'V as contra bonus mores contrary to rundamentcu morals". -
The debates vvithin the U.N. L'lternational Law Com.nrission, ·vvhich codified rhe 
0 ° ci--, 1 q~o- T' r 0 h - n1' 0 ° 10:' JUS co gens concept m tile __ o_.., \ 1enna vonventwn on t _e Law or "reanes, 
retlect the ·;ievv that the phenomenon of Nazi Germ.any rendered the pur:;1y 
1 0 ;; 0 0 1 1 0 ££< 0 ~- 1 d 103 ccmtractua_ conceptwn or mternatwna_ .aw msUIHCient 10r Lie mo •em era. 
Cousequcndy, tbe International Law Commission opined that a treaty designed 
tJ nronwte slavery or genocide, or to prepare for aggression, ought to be 
_, - 104 ° 
dec~ared vora. 
'Thus~ ptB·~uant to the jus cogens concept~ s!ates are protrftited fror.~!.. 
co1mTlitting crimes against humanity and an international agreement bei'Neer:. 
states to facilitate commission of such crimes would be void ab initio. 
Moreover, there is growing recognition that universal jurisdiction exists such 
that all states have a right to prosecute or entertain civil suits against the 
--< ~ l'·--~ _\· .... t ; -~ .. -F .; J r> n vo c> •• ' I OS -;:->... ~~ ~C' " --~p rr -n·· -.... -,~~ ~r~t·t~ '(~ 1 ....-F- <.;.,rj-, ~";" pc, I"e,la.Olu 0, .t!..'-' Cv0 ~n., cnmes. .t'lOffi uhu, ;.;OH.~ -tJL .. tl1eh"'~~- u , •.••• _ •• --'-·-
they vit"\V as the nexi: logical step and argue that the cm1cept also prGhitit:: 
100. RESTATElvlENT(THIRD)OFTHEFORE!GNRELAT!ONSLAWOFTHEUNITEDSTATES § 102 
cmt. k (l%7). 
JO]_ Unit-:;d States v. K..rupp, 9 TRIALS OF V'l AR CRiM!l,IALS BEFORE THE iJTERE1·1BE?.G 
l•/.\ILJTARYTP.lBUJ·IAJ...SUNDERCO!'-lTROLCOUNCILLAWHO. 10, at 1395 (1950). 
102. A.nicle 53 of the Vienna Convention provides: 
A trt:.aly is vo~d if~ at the ti!ne of its conclusion~ it coDflicts vvith a pere·n1f>l.Ory Tlt.Hln 
of general international lavv. For the purposes of the present Cvn\'ti!tiG1!, ti. 
p~rr:rnp•:or~/ r:onn of general intenla!:iona1la\V is a norr.n accr::pted !1nd rr:c·ognizr::r.:! L:~.r 
the international comn1unity of States as a V:.thole rr~ a no~m from 'Fbicb :1·:· 
derogation is pern1itted and \:vhich can be !nodifitd only ty a subs~5quent i1G.rEJ 0f 
gr,neral international law having the same c!Jamcter. 
-fi.::nna Convention~ SL(pra note 67, at =~44. 
1 o::~. P.e~narks of P._ntonio de Luna (Spain) in Suinn:tor~~ Records of'th.e ! 5th Session, 6/J.::/dl 
jtfc.?ting: [1g63] 1 ·l.B. IDt'l L. Conun'n72, ~i 61, UJ .. L D-oc.lJCl'L~i.J156 Cr. il.ddenda. 
104. Jd. 
105. Ivi.ichael !?. Scharf, The ICC's Jurisdiction over the Na!ionals of Non-Party S:ates: fi 
·':n'tiqr!e oft he US. Positio11, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 67, 38-90 (2001) ("Iii::: IJOW V!idely 
accepted that crimes against humanity are subject to universal jurisdiction."):. Dernjanjuk '!. 
Petrovsky, 776 F.2d 571, 58:2 (6th Cir. 1985) (observing that "[i]ntemntional law recognizr::r. 
\;niversa] jurisdiction~ over certain offenses, u including crimes against hurnanit:/ a!!d g':"':rlG·:ide). 
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states from undertaking any action that wmlld frustrate prosecution, such as 
granting amnesty or asylum to those who have committed crimes against 
h -,·,., 106 
•. umau,y. 
Such scholars fail, however, to take into consideration the fact that 
although jus co gens has natural law underpinnings, the concept is also related 
to customary law. A rule will qualify as jus co gens only if it is "accepted by the 
international community of States as a whole as a norm from which no 
derogation is permitted. "107 Thus, jus co gens norms have been described by one 
court as "a select a11d narrow subset of the nonns recognized as customary 
intemationallaw. "108 As with ordina..ry customary internationallaw,jus co gens 
norms are fom!ed th.rough widespread state practice and reCOgl'llition, w9 but 
unlike ordinary customary international law, a state can no~ avoid application of 
a jus co gens norm by being a persistent objector during its formation. 
Though there is no question that the intematioilllaJ community has accepted 
l:hat the prohibition against cowJill11jtting crimes against humanity qualifies as a 
jus co gens norm, 1 !O this does not mean that tlile associated duty ~o prosecute has 
106. See supra note 8 (collecting sources). 
107. Vienna Convention, supra note 67, at 344. 
108. Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany, 26 F. 3d 1166, 1 i 80 (D.C. Cir. I 994) (Wald, 
J., dissenting) (citing Comm. of U.S. Citizens lLiving irr Nicar. v. Reagan, 859 F.2cl929, 9L!O 
(D.C. Cir. 1988)). 
109. As Judge Patricia Wald noted in Princz: 
To ascertain customary international law, judges resor£ 1o "1he customs and usages 
of civilized nations, and, as evidence of these, to tbe works of jurists and 
commentators." These same tools are used to determine whether a norm of 
customary international law has attained the special status of a jus L·ogens norm. 
!d. (quoting The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900)). 
110. See Siderman de Blake v .. A.rgentina, 965 lF.2d 699, 7l5 (9th Cir. 1992) ("The 
universal and fundamental rights of human beings identified by Nuremberg-rights against 
genocide, enslavernent, and other inhunnane acts-are the dh:ecL ancestG~·s of the universal and. 
funciamental norms recognized as jus cogens." (citation omitted!)); Den~janjuk, 776 P.1d at 5g2 
(s<ating that ''[i)ntemational law recognizes 'universal jurisdiction' over certain offenses," 
including crimes against humanity a11d genocide); Hirsh v. llsrael, 962 iF. Supp. 377, 381 
(S.D.N.Y. 1997), aff'd 133 F.3d 907 (2d Cir. 1997) ("A foreign state violates jus co gens when it 
participates in such blatant violations of fundaiJienial human rightc; z.s 'genoc~d~, d:t'J5t~.'~ 
murder, torture, prolonged arbitrary detention, and racial discrimination."' (quoting Com;n. of 
U.S. Citizens Living in Nicar. v. Reagan, 859 iF.2d 929, 941 (D.C. Cir. i988)); Barcelona. 
Traction, lLight & Power Co. (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 LCJ. 3, 32 (Feb. 5) (clistinguishing 
beiween rights of prolection that have entered into the body of general !ntemational iaw and 
those th<:>.t are confe!Ted by international instruments); Reservations to the Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Advisory Opinion, l95 1 tCJ. 15, 23 
(Ivlay 28) ("The principles underlying the Convention are recognised by civilised nations as 
binding on States even without any conventional obligation."); Theodor Meron, 
!ntematioHal C;-iminalization of Internal Atrocities, 89 AM. J. !i,JT'L L. 554, 558 (1995) 
(liThe core prohibitions of crirnes against htnnanity f.rtd the crinl!e of genocide ccnstitntejl!S 
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sirrmhaneousiy attained an equivalent status. h fact, all evidence is to the 
contrary. I'-Joi' only have there been nurnerous instances of states providing 
3J11nesty and asylum to leaders accused of crimes against humanity, but, even 
=nore telling, there have been no protests from states when such am!'1esty or 
asylum has been offered. Moreover, there has been widespread judicial 
recognition that the jus co gens nature of crimes against humai'1ity does not 
prevent accused perpetrators from successfully asserting head of state im!11Unity 
or sovereign imrnunity to avoid criminal or civii liability in foreign courts. 111 
Because jus co gens, as a peremptory norm, wou1d by definition supersede the 
customary intemationa1law doctrine of head of state immunity where the two 
come into conflict, the only vvay to reconcile these rulings is to conclude that 
;che: diuty to prosecute has not attained jus co gens status. 
As compared to the substantive rule oflavv prohibiting states from entering 
into iE1term~tiona! agreements that facilitate the commission of crimes against 
hmnanity, the procedma] obligation of ~hiro! p;::uiies to prosecute such crimec 
after their CCTJ1iTJLission constitutes a far greater il!1trusion imo a state's internal 
sovereignty, with far less justification. Thus, it is se11sible that such an 
encroachment would require the state's consent through the carefully 
negotiated provisions of a treaty-such as the Geneva Conventions, Genocide 
Convention, or Torture Convention.-whicb wouid na!Towly define lhe 
s.pp1]cab1e chrcunr1stances and perhaps-Iike !be JEc,~·ne S:t2.tute-p~·.u":.Jide escape 
dauses permitting states to disregard the obligation ro prosecute >.vhen strict 
,:;nforceruent would frustrate greater interests of international peace and justice. 
'Jf'he at<:}Ve d]scussion RllldTicaKes there (}LR·e freqpJJendy no ~nlternat~O~jc.I 
~legal COIT1slraints on [he Kl!egotialt]on of 3lD .SJThT1es~y/e;~~](~-for-·peBI:~e de3L 2:rM5l tb.S:lt 
CDgc:n:; TIO!TE1S."_). 
Ill. Sa Wei v. Jiang, 383 F.3ci 620, 6'!.7 C/lh Cir. :!004·) (concluding that vioiation of jus 
co gens is not ~m irnplied Vv'c.iver of head of state ir£~munity ); Sr!litb 'J. 2or::i2i1ist P·eopl.::~ s :__ib),D.!1 
hab Jamahiriya, lOi F.3d 239, 244 (2d Cir. !996) (same); lPrincz v. Federal Republic of 
~Germany~ 26 F.3d 1166~ I 173 (D.lC. Cir. 1994) (same); Sid.en11an de Blake v. i~gentina~ 965 
F.2d 699, 719 (9th Cir. 1992) (determining whether sovereign immunily under U.S. law applies 
to jus co gens violations); R~egina ·v. Bo\v 8l. 1\lietro. St]pendiary htlagistrate~ ex p(1ne J?inochet 
Ugarte (No.3), [2000] 1 A. C. 147 (H.L 1 999) (U.K.) (allowing head of slate immunity defense 
for crimes ccnnmitted prior to ratificatioi1 of Torture Convention); 1Case (:oncern!ng the Arrest 
Vvarrant of l 1 April2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Bel g.), 2002 i.C.l21-22 (Feb. !4), available m 
http://wwvv.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/iCOBE/iCOBEfr::une.htm (denying exception to head of 
state immunity for war crimes); A.l-Adsani v. United Kingdom, No. 35763/97, § 61, Eur. Ct. 
H.R. (2001) (r.!lTirwjng state immDnit}' from iEter~1?:ticnal civil suit::;). 
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in certain circumstances swapping aJl!1.J.!esty/exile for peace can serve the 
interests of both peace and justice. However, an international criminal tribunal. 
is not bound to defer to a domestic amnesty/exile arrangement. 112 During the 
negotiations for the Rome Statute creating the International Criminal Court 
(ICC), the United States and a few other delegations expressed concern that the 
ICC would hamper efforts to halt human rights violations and restore peace and 
democracy in places like Haiti and South Africa. 113 
According to the Chairman of the Rome Diplomatic Conference, Philippe 
Kirsch. of Canada, the issue was not definitively resolved during the Diplomatic 
Conference. Rather, the provisions that were adopted reflect "creative 
a.mbiguity" that could potentially allow the prosecutor and judges of i!he KCC to 
interpret the Rome Statute as permitting recognition of an amnesty or asyhllm 
0 h 0 ° d" 0 f h 114 except10n to t e JUns 1ctxon o_ t _e court 
1. The Preant.ble 
The preamble to the Rome Statute suggests that deferring a prosecu~ion 
because of the existence of a national aiTJJ.Iies!y or asylum deal woulid be 
incompatible with the purpose of the court, namely to ensure criurninaJ 
prosecution of persons vvho cominit serious international Climes. In partitc1.d8!ll", 
the Preamble: 
112. The Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) recently held that the Lome Accord, 
which granted amnesty to the perpetrators of crimes committed during the conflict in Sierra 
Leone, could not deprive the SCSL of jurisdiction because the SCSL was an international cour1 
with jurisdiction over international crimes. Prosecutor v. Kallon & Kambara, Case Nos. SCSJL-
200~-15-AR72(E), SCSL-2004-16-fo.R72(E), Decision on Challenge to Jurisdiction: Lome 
Accord Jl.mnesty ~I'll 87-89 (Mar. 13, 2004), avaiiable o.t http://www.sc-si.org/ 
Documents/SCSJL-04-15-P'f-060-l.pdf & http://www.sc-si.org/SCSJL-04-15-Pl"-060-U.pdf. 
113. See U.S. Delegation Draft: State Practice Regarding Amnesties and Pardons 1 (Aug. 
17, 1997), http://www.iccnow.org/romearchive/documentsreportsprepcmt4.htmi ('The U.S. 
delegation h!!s raised the diffic:ult matter ofhov; to address amnesties and pardons in the context 
of a statute for an international criminal court."). 
! 14. l"he author discussed this issue with Philippe Kirsch over dinner during tm 
international conference in Strasbourg, France, on November 19, 1998. Michael r. Scharf, The 
flmnesty Exception to the Jurisdiction of the Intemationol Crimirwi Court, 32 COPJ,IELLKNT'L 
LJ. 507, 522 n.104 (1999). U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Arman has stated that it would be 
"inconceivable" for the ICC to undermine an amnesty-for-peace ai-rangement by pursuing 
prosecution in a situation like South Africa. Kofi A.11nan, Secretary-General ofthe U.N., Speech 
at the Witwatersrand University Graduation Ceremony (Sept. l, 1998), quoted in Darryi 
Robinson, Sen,ing the Interests of justice: Amnesties, Truth Commissions and the lidernational 
Criminal Cm.m, 14 EuR. J. IJ.JT'LL. Ll,g2 n.5 (2003). 
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Afiirm[s] that the most serious crimes of concern to the international 
cmRmunity as a whole must not go unpunished and that their effective 
prosecution must be ensured ... 
Recall[s] that it is the duty of every State to e;:erc1.se 1ts 
jurisdiction over those responsible for international crimes ... 
• • 1 
cnmmat 
[And] Emphasiz[ es] that the International Criminal Court established under 
this Statute shall be complementary to national criminal jurisdictions. 115 
Preambular language is important because international law provides that 
"[a) treaty shaH be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary 
meaning to be given to the ten:.11s of the treaty in their context and in i:he light of 
its object and purpose." 116 Thus, the Rome Statute's preamble constitutes a 
critical source of interpretation because it indicates both the treaty's context and 
il!:s object and purpose. Yet, notwithstanding this preambular language, there 
are seven;] articles of the Rome Statute (discussed below) that rnight be read as 
pennitting the court under certain circumstances ·to Iecognize an amnesty 
exception to its jurisdiction. The apparent conflict between these articles and 
the preamble reflects the schizophrenic nature of the negotiations at Rome: 
The preambular language and the procedural provisions were negotiated by 
entirely different drafting groups, and in the msh of t~e dosing days of the 
Ro:me Cof!..fe.rence, the drafting committee never fuHy integTated and reconciled 
the separate portions of the Statute. 
2. Article 16: Action by the Securiiy Council 
V\T]tb respect to a poten~iai arrmesty/asy!um exception, the most import21i1t 
provision of [he Rome Statute is Artide I 6. Under that artilde, the ICC vvouk! 
b~ ret:;p}ired fc1::> def~r to 2. nati.ona~ a.nmcsi.)i Jif the Setud~y Cm.mciJ adopts a 
Tesolu~ion under Chapter VTI of the United N atilons Charter requesting fine cownt 
no1t to COITJ.menKe 2LH inves~igation or prosecution, or ito defer ru'1Y proceedings 
akeady in progress. 117 The Security Council recently invoked its r.i.ghlt urrH:iler 
115. Rome Statute, :mp;-a note 56, pmbl. 
I 16. Vienna Conveniion, supra note 67, at 340. 
117. Article 16 of the Rome Statute, titled, "Deferral of investigation or prosecution," 
states: 
No investigation or prosecution may be commenced or proceeded with under this 
Statute for a peri.od of 12 months a.frer the Security Council, in a resolution adopred 
under Chapter VH of the Charter of the United Nations, has requested the Court to 
that effect; that request rrt.i:\)' be renewed b:,' the Council under the same condirions. 
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_A_rticle 16 of the Rome Statute in adopting Eesoh.Jtion 1593, referring the 
Darfur atrocities to the ICC for prosecution but at the same time providing that 
Lhe ICC could not exercise jurisdiction over foreign :military personnel in 
Dat-fur who are from states (other than Sudan) that are not parties to the Rome 
S' ,, t ]]8 -, G:tcu e. 
The Security Council has the legal authority to require the court to respect 
an anmesty or asylum if two requirements are met, namely: (1) the Security 
Council has determined the existence of a threat to the peace, a breach of the 
peace, or an act of aggression under Article 39 of the U.l'-J. Charter; 119 and 
(2) the resolution requesting the ccn.1rt' s deferral ~s consistent vJiili the purposes 
fu!d principles of the United Nations with respect to maintaining international 
peace and security, resolving threatening situations i.n conformity wit.h 
principles of justice and international law, and promoting respect for human 
rights and fundamental freedoms under Article 2.4 of the U.N. Charter. 120 
The decision of the Appeals Clumber of the ~:{ugoslavia Tribunal i:u the 
Tadic case suggests that the ICC could assert that it lhas the authority to 
independently assess vvhe~her these two requirements were met as prui of its 
incidental power to detemilne the propriety of i.ts own jurisdiction (competence 
de la competence). 121 One comn1entator has characterized thi.s aspect of ilhe 
Appeals Cha.Jt-nber decision as "strongly support[ing) those who see the U.N. 
Charter not as unblinl\:ered license for poi!ce action but as an emerging 
constitution of c:nurnerated, !irrrited povvcrs subject to the. rule of lavv ." 122 lit is 
possible, then, that the ICC would not necessarily be compelled by i!:he 
exisience of a Security Council resolution to terminate an investigation or 
prosecution were it i:o find that an amnesty contravenes ]ntemationallai-v. 
"\J\lhile an amnesty or exile arrangemen! accompanied by the establishment 
<.:,f a tmth •:;o:mrnission, victim ~~mnpensation, and lustr2ction mJght be i.n ~he 
in!.erests of justice in !he broad sense, i~ \VouM nonetheless be in contravention 
of in~emation.H! £a1v where ~~he grave breaches provisions f''f tl]e ] 949 Genev;;, 
l!.::onve:ntjon.s, [he Genocide Convention, or the Tor~ure Cmwentlion aure 
appficab]e. H is especially note\vmthy tha( the Geneva Conventions require 
Rome Statute, supra note 56, art. 16. 
113. S.C. Res. 1593, 'J[6, lJ.I-J. Doc. S:llP.:.ES/ 1593 (Mar. 3l. 2005), avaiiable at 
l!ttp://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc_resolutions05.htm. 
119. U.N. Charter art. 39. 
120. tJ.l,·!. ~Charter CJrL 24~ paras. f.-2. 
121. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-l-AR72, Decision on ihe Defence Ivllotion for 
Enterlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction 'lf 6 (Oct. 2, ! 995). 
122. Jose E. Alvarez, Nuremberg Revisited: The Ta.dic Case, 7 EUR. J. XNT'Lli~. 245, 2'!-9 
(~996;. 
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parties "to provide effective penal sanctions for persons com1nitting, or 
ordering to be committed, any of the grave breaches of the present 
Cmwention," 123 that the Genocide Convention requires pa_rties "to provide 
effective penalties for persons guilty of genocide,-" 124 ~d that the Torture 
Convention requires parties to make torture "punishable by appropriate 
penalties which take into account their grave nature." 125 
This would suggest that the ICC might not defer to the Security Council 
under Article 16 of the Rome Statute where the accused is charged vvith grave 
breaches of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, the crime of genocide, or torture. 
Yet, a strong counterargument can be made that the Rome Statute codifies only 
the substantive provisions of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, the Genocide 
Convention, and the Torture Convention, and does not incorporate those 
procedural aspects of the Conventions that require prosecution (which apply to 
the state parties but not to the ICC, which has its own international legal 
personality). Accordingly, ilie nature of the charges might constirur~e a factor to 
be considered but vvould not necessarily be a bar to deferring to an amnesty or 
exile a.rrangement 
3. Article 53: Prosecutorial Discretion 
Where the Security Council has not requested the ICC to respect lli"1 
amnesty m exile-for-peace deal and thereby to tenninate a prosecution, the 
court's prosecutor may choose to do so under Ar~ide 53 oftl1e Rome Statute. 126 
That article pe1mits the prosecutor to decline to initiate an investigation (even 
when a state party has filed a complaint) where the pmsecutor concbdes there 
123. Geneva Convention X, supra note 44, art. 49. 
124. Genocide Convention, supra note 45, <:crt. V. 
125. Torture Convention, st!pra note 46, art. 4. 
126. A.sijicle 53 of the Rom.e Statute titled~ "Initiation of Hf! ~nvest1gation~ ~~ pro~~.ridles in 
relevant part: 
i. The Prosecutor shall, having evaluated tbe infom1ation made available to him or 
her, initiate an investigation unless he or she deter111ines that there is no reasonable 
basis to proceed under this Statute. In deciding whether to initiate ail investigation, 
the Prosecutor shaH consider whether: ... 
(c) Talcing into account the gravity of the crime and the interests of victims, 
there are nonetheless substantial reasons to believe that an investigation would 
not serve the interests of justice. 
H the !Prosecutor determines that there is no reasonable basis to proceed and his or 
her determination is based solely on subparagraph (c) above, he or she shall inform 
the Pre-Trial Chamber. 
Rome Statute, supra ncte 56, e:rt. 53. 
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are "substantial reasons. to believe that an investigation would not serve the 
interests of justice." 127 However, the decision of the prosecutor under .AJtide 
53 is subject to review by the pretrial chamber of the court. In reviewing 
whether respecting an arru1esty or exile deal and not prosecuting would better 
serve "the interests of justice," the pretrial chamber would have to evaluate the 
benefits of a particular amnesty or exile arrangement and consider whether 
there is an international legal obligation to prosecute the offense (as discussed 
above). 
4. Article 17: Complementarity 
Where neither the Security Council nor the prosecutor has requested lthe 
ICC to defer to a n.ational<t~unesty, the concerned state can attempt to raise the 
issue under Article 17(l)(a) of the Rome Statute. That article requires the court 
to disri1iss a case where ''[t]he case is being investigated or prosecuted by a 
State which has jurisdiction over it, unless the State is unwilling or unable 
genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution. "128 It is significant that 
the article requires an investigation but does not specify that it be a criminal 
investigation. The concerned state could argue that a truth commission 
(especially one modeled on that of South Africa) constitutes a genuine 
investigation. On ti'le other hand!, subsection (2) of Artide ] 7 suggests that trhe 
127. ld. DarTy! Robinson, who served on Canada's delegation to the ICC Preparatory 
Committee from 1997-2002 and is currently a legal adviser to the ICC Prosecutor, has proposed 
the following criteria for deterwining whether deferring to an aw_nesty or exile arrangemeDt 
would be "in the interests of justice": 
o Was the measure adopted by democratic will? 
o Ks the departure from the standard of criwinal prosecurion of all offenders 
based. on necessity~ i.e. [sic] irresistible social~ -::~.::D31on1ic or po1itjc9J 
renlities? 
0 !s there a full and effective i111vestigation into the facts? 
-o Does the fact-finding inquiry 'name names'? 
0 Js the relevant commission or body independent and suimbly resonrced? 
o Is there at least some form of punishment of perpetrators (are they 
identified, required to come forward, required to do community service, 
subject to lustration)? 
o Ks some form of remedy or compensation provided to victims? 
o Does the national approach provide or sense of closure or justice to 
victims? 
o Is there a corn.mitment to comply with other human rights obligations? 
Robinson, supra note J.JL!., at 4·97-98. 
128. ld. art. 17(l)(a). 
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sland~r~1 fc.; dete!.!.lrining that an invesLigaLion is noi genu!ne 1s V\lhe~~he:r {ht 
proceedings are ilinconsistent V\'ith an intent to bring the pr::rson ~:oncerned t.o 
: . • rr 1:::!.9 ·, ~ • ~ ' • J • · • jUSnce -a phrase t11at nmght oe mterpreteu as requmng cmrunai 
proceedings. 
* * * 
In sum, the Rome Statute is purposely ambiguous on the guestwn 0f 
·whether the iCC should defer to an arrLiiesty/exile-fm-peace am:;.ngemem in 
deciding whether ta exercise its jurisdiction. Vvhile amnesties and exiles are 
sometimes a necessar-y bargaining chip in negotiations for the peaceful transfer 
of political power, it must be recognized that such ru-rangements can vary 
greatly. Sorne? as in ScJuth Africa c.nd £-Ka!ti~ are c-losely ]jnked tc mech0_~iis~~-1~ 
fm providing accountability and redress; others, as in the case of the exile of 
Charles Taylor, are simply a mindful forgetting. The ICC should take "'>nly thF: 
former types of amnesties/exiles into accoum in prosecutorial decisions. 
I,;loreover, the ICC should be particularly rductan! to defer 1to an amnest.y/Pxile 
in situations, in.;/Gh.!iEg ·vio1at]ons of intenn.ational conventions that CfCS.'tt 
otHgations to prosecute~ such as the 1·Jenocide Convention and the grrxve. 
breaches provisions of the Geneva Conventions. The other intemctti()':c;l 
agreements and customary intemationaJ. law crimes that make up the ICC" s 
subjecf. matter jt~risdiction n10.ke prosecution f~·r rel.?:.ted crirnes possible~ b~Jit r.:Gr~ 
rr1cntdatory, ~ind should be ·~reated as such by the. court iD tbe broader .~lr.~etests of 
peace an.cf ]uternf}~icnai security. 
IV. Conclusion 
tit1r: illit.:::rnadona1 procedl~Jt81 ]a\v in1pGsir;.g .s. 
. . . . -· ....... 130 
i!J-[\1~f:k £A8J:J!l)[~f:;:t ·lJ t"J;-(-:,jp 2-~-S-
129. Id. an. 1~/C!)(b). ·Cantj}C!i~e Bruce E-Tocn1.he1l, Th2 (:r:!;-:zati:a.-zal Criitli.iltil Cou;·t: r_ 
-Checklisr fc;- l·!cnionti! Jrnpiernenro.tion! in ICC RATIM·CATTON AND l"·1ATlOJ-..iAL Kl1/1PLEl\iJEi~-!T!HG 
LEGISLATION l4L!- (I\.1{ ~Chcrif Bassiouni ed., 1999) ( 11It is also conceivable that an ;unn·.::sty 
granted in the context of u. 'trntb corr..rnissi0n.~ prot::css con1d bt considered an 'inve;;tlgatlcr/ 
follo·wed by a bona f!de decision not to procet:-d for the purposes of A.rticle 17( l)(b). 11 ):. quori?t.:l 
in Robinson., supra note 1 E ~!-:a( 499 n .78~ 1rith John I-Iohnes~ The Principle ofCornplenu!ntar-i~J· .. 
in THE lNTERNATJOJ·JAL Cfi.lMii'lAL COURT: THE MAKJNG OF THE ROME STA DJTE 77 (R.S:. Lee erl. 
1999) ("It is c1ear that the- 3taxute~ s provir.ions c.n somp~erneniarity are intt::nded ~o ~-c.fer ~.c. 
cri1ninal investigat~ons .... A. t!"Pth comwi.:.sion and Lhe amnesties it provides may not r.neet lbs 
test of a crin1i~1aJ. iilvestiga.!icu .... ~~)~quo red in Robinson. supra note 114-, a1499 n.b i. 
130. Cf Ratner, st:pra note HJ, al 7·14 (characterizing the procedural requiren1ent to 
prosecute as lla;,:count.ability non11slt .\·1nd the substantive lcrw P.:Stahlish1ng off~nse.-=: as tthsbiJ!t.~' 
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reason for this is historical: 'Nith respect to all but the most notorious of 
international crimes, it was easier for states to agree to recognize permissive 
jurisdiction than to undertake a duty to prosecute. But where the duty to 
prosecute does apply, it is critical tJ.l.at states and international organizations 
honor it, lest they express contempt for the important treaties from which the 
duty mises, potentially putting their O'VVD. citizens at risk pursuant to the 
international law principle of reciprocity. 
This is not to suggest, however, that states mus~ rush to prosecute an 
persons involved in offenses under these treaties. Selective prosecution and use 
of "exemplary trials" is acceptable as long as the criteria used ret1ect 
appropriate distinctions based upon degrees of culpability and sufficiency of 
evidence. 131 Moreover, while the provisiom; of the treaties requiring 
prosecution are nonderogable even in time of public emergency that threater1s 
~he life of the nation, the doctrine of force majeure can vva.'lrant temporm-y 
postponement of prosecutions for a reasonable amount of time until a new 
government i.s secme enough to take such action against members of the fonner 
regime or until a new government has the judicial resources to undertake fair 
. ff . . ]1? 
and e_ ectnre prosecutwns. ·-
In the case of Saddam Hussein, the United! Stai:es had accused the llraqi 
leader of grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and violations of the 
Genocide Cmwenhon. Both the United States and traq vvere parties to these 
treaties, which contain an absolute obligation to prosecute offenders. By 
offering to permit exile and perpetual sanctuary in Bahrain in lieu of invasion 
and prosecution, the Bush adm.inistration signa~ed that the provisions of these 
treaties are inconsequential, thereby undermining the rule of law i.n a critical 
area of global affairs. This must be viewed also in !nghlt of othe:r U.S. actions 
i'flJVOKving applicatiOTiit of \the Geneva c:onventions to the conflict in Kraq, fHOSt 
notably \the infamous VIh.ite House n'iemos agthoTedi by nm~v Attomey Gener;;J 
AJberftG Guii::aJes. The men111os refer to tlhe Geneva Conventions as "obso£eite" 
and "qpJJain1t~" 133 and -sNfOfltg~y opiuae ·~hat itLEe 1'v£[Ufl:; t_=ODI.h=:ntion perrii.1.its ;rn]Jj 
norms"); Mark A. Surrc\'ners, The International Court of Justice's Decision in Congo v. 
Belgiurr1: J-lavv I-I as li' Affzctcd the D:3v~lop:n.ent of C! Principle ('.f i)r!!V'3.i"&"!f Jurisdic1ion that 
Would Obligate All States to Prosecute War Criminals?, 21 B.U. Ii'-H'L L.J. 63, 95 (2003) 
(characterizing the procedural requirement to prosecute ilS "obligatory universul jtEisdiction," 
and distinguishing it from "voluntary universal jurisdiction"). 
131. Michaei P. Scharf & Nigel Rod!ey, lntemcrtimwi Law Principles on Acco;mtabifh:\', iii 
POST-CONFLICT JUSTICE 89,95 (M. CherifBassiouni ed., 2002). 
J 32. ld. at 96. 
133. Memorandum from J\Jberto R. Gonzales, Counsei to the President, to President 
George W. Bush, at 2 (Jan. 25, 2002), available at http://wwvv.lmmamightsfirst.org/u~_law/ 
etn/gov_rep/gov_memo_int!aw.htm. !.Il a dissenting memo, Secretary of State Colin Pm'iel! 
········11 
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C f 134 - b · ]' r -· d • d · · ] wrms o' torture, there y creatmg a c 1mate or d1s am to war . mtematwna_ 
humanitarian law and opening the door to the abuses committed at Abu Ghraib 
prison in Iraq. lin a statement before the Senate Judiciary Committee, Admiral 
Jiohn Hutson, Judge Advocate Genera] of the U.S. Navy from 1997-2000, 
urged the Bush adrrlinistration to officially and unequivocally repudiate 
Gonzales's erroneous position. ln doing so, Hutson stressed that: 
Since World War Hand looking into the foreseeable future, United States 
armed forces are more forward-deployed both in terms of numbers of 
deployments and numbers of troops than all other nations combined. ·what 
this means in practical terms is that adherence to the Geneva Conventions is 
more important to us than to any other nation. We should be the nation 
demanding adherence under any and all circumstances because we will 
benefit the most. 135 
Because Hussein did not accept the exile-for-peace offer, the damage to 
tl!.e mle of law in this instance was negligible. Would greater damage to the 
rule of ]aw have neveri:heless been acceptabk: if it succeeded in averting a war 
vvhich has resulted in tem of thm~sands of casualties on both sides since 2.003? 
This Article has described the po]icy reasons generally favoring prosecution, 
including the fact that former leaders who have resorted to war crimes and 
crimes against humanity tend to be recidivists. Saddam Hussein himself 
launched a coup and initiated his policy of terror after he was released from 
prison i:hrough a domestic amnesty in li968. Xt is nor hard to imagine the 
daumgers Hussein could present to the Kraqi democratic transition fmm exile in 
Jlllearby Bahrain. Moreover, the people oftraq have insisted on Hussein's tria1 
lJefore tihe tragi Special TritmnaL 136 1\.~oraHy, what right would Ame:ricaD. 
negotiators have to trade away the ability of thousands of Hussein's victims to 
see the dictator lJrought to justice? Finally, it is worth stressing that the duty to 
aiguecl that Mr. Gonzales's position "reverse[s] over a century of U.S.. policy and practice in 
supporting the Geneva Conventions and undermine[s) the protections of the Iaw of war for our 
troops, both in this specific conflict and in general." Memorandum from Colin L. Povvell, U.S. 
Secretmy of State, to Alberto JR. Gonzales, Counsel to the Presidem, and Condoieezza Rice, 
Assistant to the President for National Security .AHairs, at 2 (Jan. 26, 2002), C~1":tilcb!e at 
http://www .humanrightsfirst.org/us_la w /etn/gov _rep/ go v _memc_inti aw. h tm. 
134. Memorandum from U.S. Dep't of Justice, Office of Legal Counsel, to Alberto R. 
Gonzales, Counsel to the President-, at 1 (Aug. l, 2002), availabie a! htip://www. 
!mmanrightsfirst.org/us_!aw/etn/gov _rep/gov _memo_intlaw .htm. 
135. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Alberto R. Gonzales to be Allamey 
General of the United States: Hearing Before S. Comm. on the Judicial}', l 09th Cong. 507 
(2005) (testimony of John D. Hutson, Dean and President of Franklin Pierce Law Center). 
136. See Scharf, Can This Man Get a Fair Trial?, supra note 1 (noting that Iraqis "insisted, 
over initial U.S. objections, on the inclusion of a provision ... that enables the [haqi Special 
Tribunal] to prosecute Hussein for the crime of aggression"). 
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prosecute Hussein arising from these treaties did not require or even justify the 
invasion of iraq. Rather, it merely prohibited actions that are manifestly 
incompatible with the prosecution of Hussein, such as arranging for exile and 
sanctuary in Bahrain. 
The situation involving Charles Taylor is distinguishable. Taylor has been 
charged by the Special Court for Sierra Leone with complicity in crirnes aga1i1st 
humanity and war crimes in an internal anned conflict. As the Special Court 
itself has recognized, since there is no treaty-based nor customary international 
law duty to prosecute crimes against humanity or war crimes in an internal 
conflict, an amnesty or exile-for-peace deal would not constitute a violation of 
intemational1aw. 137 
The distinction reflects the fact that, notwithstanding the natural lavv 
rhetoric of jus co gens employed by proponents of a broad duty to prosecute, the 
intemationallegal order is still governed by principles of positive iaw under u~he 
357-year-old Westphalian concept of sovereignty. 138 State practice belies the 
existence of a customary international law duty (based on the positive law 
notion of state acquiescence to rules over time) to prosecute outside of the 
treaty framework. Consequently, the obligation to prosecute and the 
cmTesponding duty to refrain from fn.listrating prosecution through amnesty or 
exile applies only to certain treaty-based crimes vvhere the tTeaty sets forth such 
an obligation and the affected states are party to the treaty at the time of tbe a.c~s 
in question. Tlhis conclusion is analogous to that of the House of Lords in the 
Pinochet case, in which the British High Court held thai the head of state 
imlt11"!.mity doctrine prevented the United Kingdom fron'l extraditing io Spairn 
former Chilean President Augusto lPinochet for crimes against humanity, with 
the exception of crimes of torture coJnrlLmittedl after the U.K., Cb]£e, and .Sjp2jn 
had! an ratified the Torture Convemtim1. 139 Thus, whilie ithere was a t.rea!:y-hchsed 
duty ilo prosecui:e Saddlam Husseilill under the Geneva (Conven~iGT<S and 
Genocide Convention, no si!Jich duty existed in the case of CR-w.rles Taylor. 'Nho 
1vas accused of crimes against hu.n>Xil3Jnilty. 
'finis does not memru l!l]_at 1:he Spedan Court for SieHa Leone hr,::; to honG·r 
ths Charles T~ylior ;:;xiJe-for-peace: deal. Tlhe Special Court mc..de dear ;tJhat 
amnesty and exiJe arrangements are on<ly binding within the state(s) gr;:mtnn~? 
them. They do not apply to other stai:es OJr to international tribunals such as the 
Special Court Moreover,. it is important to recognize that ami!esty, e:;~iie, a,w:l 
137. Supra note 95 and accompanying text. 
133. See Beaulac, supra note 99, at 14-8 (describing the origins of the state system in th'" 
Peace of Westphalia, which ended the Thirty Years ·war in 1648). 
! 39. Regina v. Bow St. Metro. StipendiaFy Mlagistrate, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte_ (I'! c. 3}, 
[2000] 1 A.C. 14-7, 148-49 (H.L. !999) (U.K.). 
,t' 
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sanctuary arnmgements are often temporary in nature. They are not a 
permanent right of the recipient, but a privilege bestowed by the territorial state, 
which can be revoked by a subsequent government or administration. The 
trend in recent years is to use arrmesty and exile as a transitional step toward 
eventual justice:, not as an enduring bar to justice. 140 As aU .S. Department of 
State official explained with respect to Charles Taylor, "First we'll get him out 
of Liberia, then we'll get him to the Court." 141 
140. Peter A. Barcroft, The Slow Demise of impunity in Argemiua and Chile, (Jan. 2005), 
http://www.asi!.org/insights/20D5/0l/insight050107.htm (reporting that Chile has revoked 
JFinoche!'s immunity and initiated criminal proceedings ~J.gilinst him} (on file with the 
Washington and Lee JLaw Review). 
141. Lizza, supra note 6, at W. 'fbe European Parliament is ctmently pushing for the 
adoption of a U.N. Security Council Resolution that would require i-Jigeria to sunender Taylor 
to the Special Comt for Sierra Leone for prosecution. lBruce Zagaris, European Parliament 
Passes Resolution Calling for Action to Ensure Taylor's Court Appearance, 21 INT'L 
ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 200, 200 (2005). On November l!, 2005, the U.N. Security Council 
unanimously adopted Resolution 1638, which expanded the mandate of the U.N. force in 
Liberia to include apprehending Charles Taylor in the event that he returns to Liberia and to 
transfer him to the Special Comt for Sierra Leone for prosecution. A.ithough the resolution did 
not require Nigeria to revoke Taylor's asylum, it did pointedly refer to Taylor's asylum as a 
"temporary stay" in Nigeria. S.C. Res. 1638, pmbl., 'Ill, U.N. Doc. S/FES/1638 (Nov. !1, 
2005). 
